2022/1 Archives – ACCORD https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends-issue/2022-1/ The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes Tue, 04 Jul 2023 19:10:36 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://www.accord.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/cropped-favicon-32x32.png 2022/1 Archives – ACCORD https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends-issue/2022-1/ 32 32 Conflict Trends 2022/1 https://www.accord.org.za/publication/conflict-trends-2022-1/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=conflict-trends-2022-1 Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:39:18 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=wpdmpro&p=39728 Our rules-based world order, so carefully crafted after World War II, has been violated with impunity on several occasions. Surely the time has come for us to restore the integrity and authority of our global order under the UN, underpinned by the equality of all nations.

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Editorial https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/editorial-6/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=editorial-6 Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:14:03 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39725 On 24 February 2022, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine following unresolved tensions since 2014. This war will likely involve a combination of “weapons” never before used in combat. The conventional nature of war, while remaining largely in its traditional mould, does today include a vast array of new generation weapons such as the now-famous […]

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On 24 February 2022, war erupted between Russia and Ukraine following unresolved tensions since 2014. This war will likely involve a combination of “weapons” never before used in combat. The conventional nature of war, while remaining largely in its traditional mould, does today include a vast array of new generation weapons such as the now-famous anti-tank missile that can be operated by a single soldier and consequently is very appropriately named the javelin. We are teetering on the brink of a nuclear war, with more sophisticated delivery systems being introduced whose speed and destruction will be catastrophic for the world.

In addition, we are witnessing an unprecedented, large-scale economic war through a range of sanctions. Energy is now at the centre as a weapon of war. These measures will have far-reaching consequences for the current geopolitical and economic global order and will impact the evolution of a new world order in significant ways.

Technology is changing the face of war. While the major powers are fully engaged in cyber warfare, we are also witnessing, in real-time, the power that technology has put in the hands of individuals. Hackers are independently and in collusion with governments waging a new form of asymmetrical warfare. The International Space Station, a collaborative effort of all the major powers, is in danger of being attacked, signifying the end of global cooperation and the beginning of space wars.

While a combination of 21st century technological inventions and innovations is changing the nature and intensity of war, there are still many constants. The faces of the victims remain the same. They are children, women, and men. Sexual violence as a weapon of war continues unabated. The protection of humanitarian corridors and guarantees for the safe transport of much-needed food and medicines are still the subject of long negotiations, while people continue to starve and perish. Homes, places of employment, places of worship, and culturally-significant buildings are destroyed in a matter of minutes. In short, while technology has changed the nature of war, it has not impacted or changed the human condition of war.

The Russia-Ukraine hot war, while regional in context, is global in impact. It has the possibility of resuscitating a new, long cold war with a world more divided than in the previous Cold War. It has precipitated a rearmament process in countries like Sweden that resisted a move in this direction in the post-Cold War period. There is little doubt that we will witness a new arms race here and in space. This will again shift national budgets away from human development priorities towards a senseless arms race and destruction.

The world is still dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. After three years of the spread of the virus and billions of dollars spent on research and development to produce new vaccines, we are still seeing new variant spikes in China and other Asian countries, following a wave of spikes across the United States and Europe. However, our attention is also held by coverage of the war in Ukraine and very little attention being paid to the mutation and spread of the virus.

Another equally devastating development that is on the backburner is climate change. The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General warns that we have already passed the danger point where the effects of climate change are irreversible. The global effects of climate change and the pandemic are devastating and widespread. While not impossible, overcoming and reversing the effects of the virus and climate change will be extremely difficult.

If the war in Ukraine deteriorates into a nuclear war, it will have an immediate, if not instantaneous impact, and its devastation will dwarf in speed, intensity, and breadth any impact that the pandemic or climate change will have on the planet. However, unlike the pandemic and climate change, both of which cannot be stopped immediately, the war in Ukraine can be stopped immediately.

The war, while having deep-rooted causes, is really about the violation of one country’s sovereignty and the security concerns of the other country not being addressed to its satisfaction. These matters, unlike the virus and climate change, do not require armies of scientists to resolve. They require sensible politicians with enough foresight or the services of a skilled mediator to guide them to an agreement. This is the purpose for which we established the UN, and we must allow it to fulfil its role. Our rules-based world order, so carefully crafted after World War II, has been violated with impunity on several occasions. Surely the time has come for us to restore the integrity and authority of our global order under the UN, underpinned by the equality of all nations.

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Military Coups in Africa: A Continuation of Politics by Other Means? https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/military-coups-in-africa-a-continuation-of-politics-by-other-means/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=military-coups-in-africa-a-continuation-of-politics-by-other-means Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:12:19 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39717 Coups in Africa appear to be a continuation of political process and leadership by another means, understood through the lens of neocolonialism.

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Introduction

The military has been an important institution for protecting States from external threats since antiquity. In fulfilling this fundamental role, military institutions have also posed security risks to their own governments, given that the ‘ability to use coercive force, though necessary to defend the nation against threats, creates the danger that the military will turn its weapons on the very regime that empowered its existence’.[1] Military personnel can fuel civil conflicts and undermine the stability of political regimes mostly in States with loose political control of the military. As Douglass North, John Wallis and Barry Weingast have argued, ‘Societies experiencing a civil war, by definition, do not have consolidated control of the military’.[2] In Africa, military institutions have, on one hand, helped to protect States from both internal and external threats, including local insurgencies. On the other hand, they have destabilised several political regimes through coup d’états. Military coups – ‘when the military, or a section of the military, turns its coercive power against the apex of the state, establishes itself there, and the rest of the state takes its orders from the new regime’[3] – have been relatively common in post-independent African States,[4] thereby raising several issues, including how to understand the relationship between politics and military coups. This article contributes to the discussion by highlighting how coups are a continuation of politics by other means, particularly in West Africa.

Figure 1: Military Coups in Africa, 1950-2021[5]

African States have experienced over 200 military takeovers between the 1960s and 2012.[6] Many analysts believed that coups were ‘going out of fashion in Africa’ by 2015 due to the limited cases on the continent.[7] At present, coups are widely seen to be ‘on the rise’[8] or ‘dangerously back in fashion’[9] in Africa, as some countries, such as Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Mali, Chad, Sudan, and Burkina Faso, have experienced a series of successful and failed military takeovers over the last three years. Apart from the foiled attempt to overthrow Guinea Bissau’s current president, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, on 1 February 2022, Burkina Faso’s most recent successful coup, in which President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was deposed by an army led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba on 24 January 2022, underscores how West African States are the most burdened by military coups on the continent. This has raised several concerns in the sub-region and questions the relevance of the regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), with respect to the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa.

Several reasons have been given for coups in Africa, including modernisation, cultural pluralism, soldiers’ greed and grievances, poor governance, corruption, autocracy, limited economic growth, and low-income levels, among other factors.[10] Many of the discussions on the causes of military coups in Africa have focused on internal actors and factors, and thus underestimated the pivotal role of foreign entities. While a few external factors, such as colonial heritage and the Cold War between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union, have been included in the causes of military coups in Africa,[11] such discussions have not been convincingly presented. For example, Robin Luckham et al. claim that disparate political systems inherited from Europeans have led to military coups in Africa.[12] This claim was debunked several decades ago by Alan Wells and William Tardoff.[13] Also, political and socioeconomic factors, such as corruption and poor governance in Africa, are sometimes discussed as though they do not exist in other parts of the world. To address these and other limitations in the literature, the article advances a twofold argument. First, it argues that military coups in Africa are best understood through the lens of neocolonialism. Second, the analysis highlights how military overthrows, even though they are not desirable in most States, are a continuation of politics by other means. The article begins by establishing the link between neocolonialism and military coups in Africa before discussing how military coups in Africa are politics by other means.

President Roch Kaboré of Burkina Faso was deposed by an army led by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba on 24 January 2022. PHOTO: PRESIDENCE DU BENIN

Neocolonialism and Military Coups in Africa

The idea of neocolonialism emerged when the first generation of political leaders in modern African States, including Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah and Nigeria’s Nnamdi Azikiwe, were confronted with post-independence contradictions. Specifically, these African leaders realised that they had political but not economic control of their States, despite achieving independence from the colonisers. Alex Quaison-Sackey, Ghana’s former Foreign Minister who is credited with internationalising the term ‘neocolonialism’ at a United Nations (UN) General Assembly meeting in 1958, defines neocolonialism as ‘the practice of granting a sort of independence with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state, and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones’[14]. Put differently, neocolonialism underlines both the transfer of political power from the European colonisers to African leaders and the persistence of foreign control of African economies through other means. Or, as Kwame Nkrumah has argued: ‘The essence of neocolonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside’.[15]

Neocolonialism is also visible in how former colonisers, including France and Britain, have undermined Africa’s political stability through coups. For example, it is now common knowledge that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was assisted by Britain to finance, mastermind, and tele-guide the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 because they considered him the greatest threat to their interests.[16] Furthermore, the former colonisers are alleged to be linked to several political assassinations in Africa. For example, France has been accused of being linked to the killing of at least 22 African presidents since 1963, including Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara.[17]

Alex Quaison-Sackey, Ghana’s former Foreign Minister is credited with internationalising the term ‘neocolonialism’ at a United Nations General Assembly meeting in 1958. UN Photo/Teddy Chen

Despite the idea of neocolonialism helping to understand several political and socioeconomic issues, including coups in modern Africa, several attempts have been made to discredit the term since its inception. For example, Alex Douglas-Home, a former British Foreign Secretary, claimed in 1964 that there is ‘no place in Britain’s political dictionary’ for the term neocolonialism as it is not real.[18] Neocolonialism has also been associated with outdated vulgar forms of Marxism and dependency theory, as well as uncompromising African leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah and Robert Mugabe, who have been labelled ‘tyrants’.[19] Currently, neocolonialism is widely used in African, British, and other political discourses as it is relevant for understanding modern Africa and some other societies.[20]

Given the longstanding link between foreign powers and insecurities in Africa, one cannot ignore the involvement of both local and foreign actors in the current wave of military coups in Africa. In September 2021, for example, news broke of how Mali’s current military regime initiated a move to hire Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group, which has been accused of serious human rights abuses in Africa. The critical question that arose from this news was whether the Russian mercenaries and/or any other foreign groups were involved in the coup that toppled Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in 2020.

To summarise, the idea of neocolonialism helps to understand how both foreign and local actors come together to fuel military coups in Africa, among other insights. Most sub-Saharan African States can still be classified as neocolonial since they continue to depend heavily on external support, including military and economic aid, for their survival. Against this backdrop, foreign powers find it relatively easy to fuel political and socioeconomic problems, including coups in sub-Saharan Africa, whenever this will help advance their interests. Having discussed military coups in Africa through the lens of neocolonialism, the next section analyses the link between coups and politics in neocolonial Africa.

Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was toppled in a coup in August 2020. PHOTO: PRESIDENCE DU BENIN

Military Coups and African Politics

One distinctive feature of military institutions, as pointed out in the introduction, is their access to weapons and coercive force, generally for the State’s protection. It follows that military institutions’ significance usually comes to light during inter-state wars – ‘organized violence carried on by political units against each other’[21] and local combats – organised violence between governments and rebels. War is, therefore, ‘the military dimension of society’, since State armies are born out of and require cooperation from society to fight wars.[22] In turn, war has been understood as part of politics ever since von Clausewitz famously argued: ‘War is a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means’.[23] Indeed, the declaration and strategies of war require deep thinking and effective policies for States to engage in combat. Similarly, military coups are a continuation of politics by other means because coup plotters need to think critically about why, when, and how to topple political regimes.

In this vein, Burkina Faso’s Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba cited the failure of the country’s ousted President Roch Kaboré to contain violence by Islamic militants as a key reason why the military had to stage the most recent coup in this West African State, which occurred in January 2022.[24] Damiba and his military colleagues were smart enough to identify a major weakness in Kaboré’s regime, which is the rising insecurities in Burkina Faso, as a justification for the coup. Also, deep insecurities, weak political leadership, and corruption have been highlighted as key factors that led to Colonel Assimi Goïta’s overthrow of Malian President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane in 2020.[25] It follows that the degree of success and failure in coup plots is heavily dependent on the depth of knowledge and quality of tactical mobilisation by the military. Any display of incessant power abuse, careless leadership, ill-thought-out political decisions, perceived and actual widespread corruption, and regime weakness, among other factors which distance political leadership from the plight of citizens, increases the chances of military coup occurrence. This is evident in West Africa, where the political system ‘works for the political class, that are well paid, that enjoy a lot from State resources, and who display arrogance and complete lack of concern about the welfare of citizens’, thereby creating conducive conditions for military coups.[26]

People gather in Ouagadougou, in support of a coup that ousted President Roch Kaboré, dissolved the government, suspended the constitution and closed borders in Burkina Faso (25 January 2022). PHOTO: REUTERS/ Anne Mimault

Therefore, in place of the conventional way of understanding military coups as interrupting politics in Africa and elsewhere, military takeovers need to be understood as politics using arms to change governments forcefully. In general, the discussion of military diplomacy has focused on how armies, including those in the US, help to spread democracy and engage in humanitarian interventions, among other diplomatic duties.[27] However, military diplomacy, particularly in West Africa, is also characterised by military coups. The latter is part of diplomacy that relies on arms or force – rather than electoral campaigns and voting – to transition from one political regime to another. As opposed to political parties that mostly lose and win elections based on their past achievements and campaign strategies, the failures and successes of military coups are largely dependent on the armed strategies that the military adopts and the weakness of the State. The effectiveness of military tactics, including the timing of coups, public grievances at stake, and help from foreign allies, contributes significantly to successful coups in neocolonial Africa. While the tenure of military regimes that assume political power through coups may be short-lived and not under constitutional rule, they take full control of States during their time in office, just as democratically elected governments do.

Jibrin Ibrahim has highlighted how ECOWAS’ failure to respond to ‘constitutional coups’, that is, the elongation of presidential tenures by incumbent presidents, and massive electoral fraud has fuelled coups in West Africa.[28] Indeed, political leaders such as Mamadou Tandja of Niger, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, and Alpha Condé of Guinea were all forced out of their presidential office by the military, after altering their countries’ constitutions to serve more than two terms in office. ECOWAS is infamous for mainly responding to military coups with threats, including setting deadlines for elections and sanctions, such as shutting down the borders of coup-affected States.

In summary, military coups are a continuation of politics by other means, especially in West Africa where the political systems favour only the political class to the detriment of the masses. Unlike democratic governments with political mandates based on constitutions and election outcomes, among other things, the political mandate of military coup leaders stems from the barrel of the gun.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members attend an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS in Accra, Ghana to hear reports from missions to Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea following military coups in those countries (25 March 2022). PHOTO: REUTERS/FRANCIS KOKOROKO

Conclusion

The article highlighted how military coups in Africa are best understood through the lens of neocolonialism. Neocolonialism helps to explain how modern African States have remained economically and militarily too weak to avert local and foreign threats since independence.[29] The heavy involvement of foreign powers in military coups and political assassinations in Africa, as well as the adoption of neocolonial currencies, such as the CFA franc by former French colonies in Africa, underlines the persistence of neocolonialism. Against this backdrop, Walter Rodney has argued: ‘The phenomenon of neo-colonialism cries out for extensive investigation in order to formulate the strategy and tactics of African emancipation and development’.[30] The resurgence of military coups in West Africa needs to be investigated further through the lens of neocolonialism.

Furthermore, the article discussed why military coups are a continuation of politics by other means. This is particularly evident in West Africa, where military takeovers are relatively common in democratic systems that favour only the political class. The current understanding of a political organisation in Africa has largely been restricted to bureaucratic institutions in which political leadership emerges from elections. However, political leadership is also achieved through military coups. Access to weapons and legitimate force on behalf of the State can allow military personnel to remove and replace Heads of States from office. Coups, therefore, are a continuation of politics by other means, even though they are generally not desirable in most States. Governments mostly create conducive conditions for military coups whenever they violate existing formal institutional arrangements, including constitutions and other legal systems that support political leadership. This is mainly seen in West Africa, where questionable political decisions, including elongating presidential terms in office and failing to provide adequate security to the local population, have fuelled military coups.

The policy implication is that governments must diligently honour social contracts with the people, which should serve as the foundation for their position in States. The political class must guard against irresponsible actions, including widespread theft of public resources and constitutional coups, as these create grounds conducive to military coups. West African politicians, in particular, need to transform their understanding of political leadership and how to relate to the local population in a more relevant way to limit coups in the region.

Dr E. Nana Amoateng is a Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy at the University of Ghana.

Women gather to support a military coup which overthrew Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, in Bamako, Mali (5 September 2020). PHOTO: REUTERS/AMADOU KEITA

Endnotes

[1] Feaver, Peter D. (1999). ‘Civil-Military Relations’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 211–241. 

[2] North, Douglass. C.; Wallis, John. J.; and Weingast, Barry. R. (2009) Violence and Social Orders,New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 153.

[3] Sampford, Charles (1991) ‘Coups d’ÉEtat and Law’, in de Attwooll, Elspeth (ed.), Shaping Revolution, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, p. 164.

[4] Barka, Habiba Ben and Ncube, Mthuli (2012) ‘Political Fragility in Africa: Are Military Coups d’État a Never-Ending Phenomenon?’ African Development Bank, Available at: <https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/economic_brief_-_political_fragility_in_africa_are_military_coups_detat_a_never_ending_phenomenon.pdf> [Accessed January 2022].

[5] Nile Post (2021) ‘Are Military Coups on the Rise Again in Africa?’ 7 September, Available at: <http://nilepost.co.ug/2021/09/07/are-military-coups-on-the-rise-again-in-africa> [Accessed January 2022].

[6] Barka, Habiba Ben and Ncube, Mthuli (2012) op. cit., p. 1.

[7] Ntomba, Reginald (2015) ‘Why are Military Coups Going Out of Fashion in Africa?’ New African, 11 November, Available at: <https://newafricanmagazine.com/11522/> [Accessed January 2022].

[8] Mwai, Peter (2021) ‘Sudan Coup: Are Military Takeovers on the Rise in Africa?’ BBC News, 26 October, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46783600> [Accessed January 2022].

[9] Seigler, Sean M. (2021) ‘Are Military Coups Back in Style in Africa?’ RAND, 1 December, Available at: <https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/12/are-military-coups-back-in-style-in-africa.html> [Accessed January 2022].

[10] Barka, Habiba Ben and Ncube, Mthuli (2012) op. cit.; McBride, Michael (2004) ‘Crises, Coups, and Entry-deterring Reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa’, Paper presented at the Public Choice Society Seminar, University of California, June; Johnson, Thomas H.; Slater, Robert O.; and McGowan, Pat (1984) ‘Explaining African Military Coups d’État, 1960-1982’, American Political Science Review, 78(3), 622–640.

[11] Barka, Habiba Ben and Ncube, Mthuli (2012) op. cit.

[12] Luckham, Robin; Ismail, Ahmed; Muggah, Robert; and White, Sarah (2001) ‘Conflict and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of the Issues and Evidence’, IDS Working Paper No. 128, Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Issues.

[13] Wells, Alan (1974) ‘The Coup in Theory and Practice: Independent Black Africa in the 1960s’, American Journal of Sociology, 79(4), 871–887; Tardoff, William (1993) Government and Politics in Africa, 2nd edn, London: Macmillan.

[14] Uzoigwe, Godfrey N. (2019) ‘Neocolonialism is Dead: Long Live Neocolonialism’, Journal of Global South Studies, 36(1), 59–87.

[15] Nkrumah, Kwame (1965) Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism,London: PANAF, p. ix.

[16] Quist-Adade, Charles (2016) ‘The Coup that Set Ghana and Africa 50 Years Back’, Pambazuka News, 2 March, Available at: <https://www.pambazuka.org/governance/coup-set-ghana-and-africa-50-years-back> [Accessed January 2022]; Doh, Emmanuel F. (2008) Africa’s Political Wastelands: The Bastardization of Cameroon,Bamenda: Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group.

[17] Chiwanza, Takudzwa (2019) ‘France has Assassinated 22 African Presidents Since 1963’, The African Exponent, 29 June 2019, Available at: <https://www.africanexponent.com/post/10487-france-has-always-carried-evil-imperialism-with-it> [Accessed January 2022].

[18] Uzoigwe, Godfrey (2019) op. cit., p. 63.

[19] Langan, Mark (2018) Neo-colonialism and the Poverty of ‘Development’ in Africa,London: Palgrave MacMillan.

[20] Uzoigwe, Godfrey (2019) op. cit.

[21] Bull, Hedley (1977) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,London: Macmillan, p. 184.

[22] Foucault, Michel (1996) ‘What Our Present Is’, in Lotringer, Sylvère (ed.), Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961-198,New York: Semiotext(e).

[23] Baylis, John; Smith, Steve; and Owens, Patricia (eds) (2014) The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 6th edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 217.

[24] BBC News (2022) ‘Burkina Faso Coup Leader Damiba Gives First Speech’, 28 January, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-60164531> [Accessed February 2022].

[25] Melly, Paul (2021) ‘Mali’s Coup: How to Solve the Conundrum’, BBC News, 27 May, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-57255601> [Accessed February 2022].

[26] Ibrahim, Jibrin (2022) ‘The Return of the Military in West Africa?’ Council on Foreign Relations – Ghana Virtual Conference Series, 3 February, Available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6IcDFlilopk&ab_channel=CouncilonForeignRelations%2CGhana> [Accessed February 2022]. 

[27] See Ebitz, Amy (2019) ‘The Use of Military Diplomacy in Great Power Competition’, Brookings, 12 February, Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/02/12/the-use-of-military-diplomacy-in-great-power-competition> [Accessed February 2022].

[28] Ibrahim, Jibrin (2022) op. cit.

[29] Langan, Mark (2018) op. cit.; Nkrumah, Kwame (1965) op. cit.

[30] Rodney, Walter (2018) How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,London: Verso, p. xiii.

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Environment, Conflict and Peacebuilding: Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict in Darfur https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/environment-conflict-and-peacebuilding-addressing-the-root-causes-of-conflict-in-darfur/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=environment-conflict-and-peacebuilding-addressing-the-root-causes-of-conflict-in-darfur Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:10:19 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39712 Climate change, political instability and ongoing conflict are reinforcing threat multipliers in Darfur.

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Any peace in Darfur must be built on solutions that go to the root causes of the conflict [1]  

Ban Ki-moon (former United Nations Secretary-General)

Background to the Conflict in Darfur

The relationship between climate change and deadly conflict is complex and context-specific, but it is undeniable that climate change is a threat multiplier that is already increasing food insecurity, water scarcity and resource competition, while disrupting livelihoods and spurring migration. In turn, deadly conflict and political instability are contributing to climate change.[2]

Darfur captured international headlines in 2004 when United States (US) Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that genocide was occurring in Sudan in his testimony to the US Senate.[3] The early-2000s conflict in Darfur between rebel groups on one side and government forces and allied militias on the other caused an estimated 300 000 deaths, and about 2.5 million people live in displacement camps across Darfur.[4] Most observers agree that the immediate cause was a regional rebellion, to which Khartoum responded by recruiting Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, to wage a campaign of ethnic cleansing against African civilians.[5] They also argue that the three core drivers of violence in Darfur at present are disputes over land and resources, the complex network of militias and paramilitary forces, and the weakness of the rule of law and security institutions.[6]

Eighteen years after the eruption of the conflict in Darfur, these conclusions regarding the main causes and triggers of the conflict remain valid. In 2021, despite the signed Juba Peace Agreement, the security situation in Darfur remained volatile, with significant inter-communal violence and fighting between government forces and rebels in the Jebel Marra area. The instability in the region continues to cause large-scale displacement, with more than 200 000 people displaced in Darfur since the beginning of 2021.[7]

The Root Causes of the Conflict

When analysing the root causes of the conflict in Darfur and building strategies for addressing displacement, international and regional actors often forget that the origins of the conflict are multiple and complicated, ethnoreligious and environmental. Since the beginning of armed violence in Darfur, the region has been labelled the “first climate change conflict” by many observers, given the convergence of environmental and political factors leading to the conflict. Sudan, in general, and the Darfur region, in particular, are home to diverse ecological zones, ranging from arid deserts in the north to semi-tropical environments in the south. In the decades leading up to the 2003 outbreak of the conflict in Darfur, the Sahel region of northern Sudan witnessed the Sahara Desert advance southward by almost a mile each year, with a decrease in annual median rainfall of 15% to 30%.[8] These factors led then United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to comment in 2007:

Almost invariably, we discuss Darfur in a convenient military and political shorthand — an ethnic conflict pitting Arab militias against black rebels and farmers. Look to its roots, though, and you discover a more complex dynamic. Amid the diverse social and political causes, the Darfur conflict began as an ecological crisis, arising at least in part from climate change.[9]

An 18-month study of Sudan by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2007 also concluded that the conflict in Darfur has been driven by climate change and environmental degradation, which threaten to trigger a succession of new wars across Africa, unless more is done to contain the damage. The UNEP reported, “Environmental degradation, as well as regional climate instability and change, are major underlying causes of food insecurity and conflict in Darfur – and potential catalysts for future conflict throughout central and eastern Sudan and other countries in the Sahel belt”[10]. Although these factors are well known to those working in this field in Darfur, it is not commonly understood outside the region. Yet it has major implications for the prospects of peace, recovery, and rural development in Darfur and the Sahel.

The Darfur region is regarded as a climate change conflict given the convergence of environmental and political factors leading to conflict. PHOTO: ORJAN F. ELLINGVAG/CORBIS VIA GETTY IMAGES

Climate Change and the Human Impact on the Environment in Darfur

Environmental degradation has intensified in recent years, undermining Darfur’s future prospects. This degradation is chiefly driven by two forces: climate change and human impact on the environment. Climate change is most visible in erratic rain levels and associated increases in drought. Partially as a result of these changes, many farmers cultivate their fields more intensively, and many have expanded to the detriment of surrounding forests and grazing land. Pastoralists, squeezed by the loss of rangelands, often over-graze their herds in smaller areas, further fuelling degradation.

The human impact on the environment is most visible in the area of deforestation, which constitutes a substantial threat, as Darfuris have cleared forests as an alternative or supplementary livelihoods strategy. Before the war broke out, tree cover in Darfur was already declining, with forests contracting at an average annual rate of over 1% between 1973 and 2006. Overall, Sudan has lost more forest cover than any other African country, and Darfur is clearly a major contributor to this trend. In fact, some forests around cities such as Nyala and El Geneina have disappeared entirely.[11]

Pressure on the environment is further intensified by current water consumption, better management of which will be crucial to Darfur’s future, including for related issues such as improved access to sanitation and health. If not addressed, all these factors will continue to lead to inter-communal conflicts and conflicts between farmers and pastoralists,[12] which often result in a significant loss of lives and mass displacement of the local population.

The Massalit community protests against genocidal atrocities committed against them in Darfur, including the murder of people and the burning of hundreds of houses and shops in April 2022 (14 May 2022). PHOTO: ALISDARE HICKSON

Current Patterns of Inter-communal Conflict and Displacement

The cycle of deadly violence in Darfur is ongoing. For example, on 16 January 2021, attacks on the Krinding camps in El Geneina, the capital of West Darfur State, led to the deaths of more than 160 people (most of them ethnic Massalit). The details of the attacks are horrific. The Arab tribal militia reportedly looted and burnt many houses and shops in the Krinding camps and surrounding areas. According to a statement to Sudan Television by the West Darfur Governor on 17 January 2021, almost a third of the camps were reduced to ashes. The flash update by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on 14 February 2021 indicated that 180 000 people were displaced in El Geneina and the surrounding villages after the Krindig attack.[13] The attack followed the killing of an Arab man by a Massalit man during a quarrel on 15 January 2021. El Geneina city witnessed a similar revenge attack by some Arab militia at the end of December 2019.

The 2021 attack was a terrible reminder that security remains elusive in Darfur and impunity is still widespread in the long-troubled region. It also serves as a reminder that even small interpersonal disputes between members of different communities can quickly turn into large-scale violence and massive displacement of people who have already been displaced in the past.

The international community should, therefore, support the efforts of the Government of Sudan towards addressing the root causes of the violence in Sudan. The focus should be on early warning and early response to address imminent intercommunal conflicts in the region in a timely manner and avert the spread of violence. When analysing the root causes of intercommunal violence, it is important to pay sufficient attention to the environmental challenges and climate change as they often come up as the main reasons for such conflicts.

The task of firewood collection falls to women and girls in Darfur, which exposes them to conflict-related sexual violence and gender-based violence. PHOTO: ALBERT GONZALEZ FARRAN – UNAMID

Successful Initiatives and Lessons Learnt from Previous Interventions

International, regional and national actors have long been trying to address the climate crisis in Darfur to reduce its impact on the civilian population. There have been both successful initiatives that need to be built upon and efforts that could not be sustained. Urbanisation, population growth, and the effects of climate change have increased pressure on Darfur’s forests. But the conflict has intensified the toll on Darfur’s trees at the precise moment when thousands of families need new sources of income.

In Darfur, the task of firewood collection falls to women. Reports of violent assaults on women collecting firewood have prompted the UN-African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to devise innovative solutions for protecting both women and the environment in Darfur. From May to October 2017, the Mission developed and implemented a project aimed at providing training to 800 rural and internally displaced persons (IDP) women on the production of fuel-efficient stoves in one of the most conflict-sensitive areas in Darfur: Sortony, North Darfur.

Fuel-efficient stoves reduce fuel consumption and provide a substitute for the traditional three-stone fire. PHOTO: ALBERT GONZÁLEZ FARRAN – UNAMID

These stoves were specifically designed to reduce fuel consumption and provide a substitute for the traditional three-stone fire. They can be made of mud, clay or metal, and they use different types of fuels, such as fuelwood, charcoal, briquettes, biofuels, liquefied petroleum gas, or kerosene. In addition, they reduce the exposure of women and girls to conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), since they have to collect fuelwood less often. As fuel-efficient stoves can be made fairly easily from local materials and they consume less wood, their popularity is increasing.

The impact of the fuel-efficient stove project cannot be underestimated. According to the Sudanese National Forests Corporation, the amount of firewood saved by using fuel-efficient stoves in comparison to traditional open-fire cooking is over 50%.[14] Project beneficiaries were trained to produce fuel-efficient stoves using easily accessible, low-cost local materials, and they generate additional income by making and selling the stoves. A single household saves an average of 99 Sudanese pounds per day on firewood by using one of the new stoves. Women and girls are somewhat better protected from SGBV by this new initiative. Women and children’s health is also better protected from the smoke emissions of traditional stoves. Using the fuel-efficient stoves, cooking fires are more contained, which reduces the safety risks. Vegetation cover is also improved due to tree planting and reduced firewood extraction.

Fuel-efficient stoves have proved to play an important role in saving forests and improving women’s safety and security in humanitarian crises and post-conflict situations. However, such initiatives cannot be sustainable in the long term if they are not coupled with nationally owned environmental protection strategies and the effective rule of law.[15]

As far as unsustainable practices are concerned, the management of water resources has been sidelined since 2003, when there was a major humanitarian response to the Darfur conflict, by the need to concentrate on the provision of water for the large number of people displaced by the conflict. Emergency use of water resources in Darfur following short-term unsustainable approaches eventually replaced more comprehensive water resources planning and development. In some instances, this has caused alarming drops in the water table. Furthermore, the ready access to water in IDP camps has led to maladaptive livelihoods among the displaced, such as brickmaking, which has flourished in some camps through the use of water intended for drinking. Internalising such valid concerns as equity and social justice in resource utilisation calls for a strategic and integrated approach to water resources management.

Stakeholders should support the use of stabilised soil block technology across Darfur as an alternative to traditional bricks, which consume large quantities of firewood and water in the fabrication process. PHOTO: CIAN FENTON

Major Priorities for International, Regional and National Actors

Severe environmental degradation poses a direct threat to Darfur’s immediate stability and undermines future prospects for peace and prosperity. This degradation is the result of climate change, over which Darfuris have little control, as well as the impact of human activities. As discussed previously, environmental issues have frequently been at the root of the conflict in Darfur, as growing numbers of people compete for dwindling resources. Strengthening environmental management is, therefore, critical not only for resolving the current crisis, but also for promoting lasting solutions for Darfur in the longer term.

Therefore, one of the main priorities is to promote the use of alternative energy and technology, particularly for construction. Most Darfuris rely on firewood or charcoal to meet their energy needs, leading to untenable rates of deforestation. International, regional and national actors should promote alternative technologies that can attenuate the impact on natural resources. For example, for construction in Darfur, stabilised soil blocks (SSBs) have tremendous potential as an alternative to traditional bricks, which consume large quantities of firewood and water in the fabrication process. Stakeholders should support the use of SSB technology across Darfur, disseminating the necessary tools and inputs as widely as possible, and assisting traditional brick-makers in transitioning to new technology, including with necessary training.

The second priority is to improve water harvesting, access and management. International, regional and national actors should work with local counterparts to improve the management of water resources and expand access to water in a way that will promote sustainability. To achieve this objective, they should support integrated water resource management among local authorities and communities across Darfur.

Since deforestation poses an enormous threat to Darfur, and maladaptive livelihood strategies have dramatically accelerated the toll of the conflict on Darfur’s trees, the third priority is to support better management of forest resources. International, regional and international actors need to support participatory reforestation and afforestation efforts to promote better management. Such support could include the development of commercial woodlands and nurseries, as well as greater support for forest-based livelihoods derived from products such as gum arabic, honey, and hibiscus, among others.

All efforts should be complemented by intensive outreach to raise awareness. International, regional and national actors should dramatically increase community outreach on environmental issues to empower Darfuris to lead sustainable environmental management efforts. Outreach campaigns should explain the causes of environmental degradation and provide information on how specific adaptations could potentially reverse this decline.

Finally, international and regional actors should support the capacity of official institutions to conduct rigorous analysis and develop research-based environmental policies.

It should also be noted that, ultimately, all progress is the responsibility of local communities, their leaders, and the Government of Sudan. International and regional actors can support the fulfilment of these responsibilities by leveraging resources and expertise.

Zurab Elzarov is Chief of the Learning, Leadership and Management Development Section at the UN Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance (DMSPC) at UN Headquarters in New York, and former Chief of the Civil Affairs and Protection of Civilians Sections at UNAMID.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent those of UNAMID or the UN.

Endnotes

[1] Ki-moon, Ban (2007) ‘A Climate Culprit in Darfur’, UN Secretary-General, 27 June, Available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/articles/2007-06-16/climate-culprit-darfur> [Accessed 7 January 2022].

[2] International Crisis Group (2008) ‘Climate Change and Conflict’, Available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/future-conflict/climate> [Accessed 10 January 2022].

[3] Weisman, Steven R. (2004) ‘Powell Declares Genocide in Sudan in Bid to Raise Pressure’, New York Times, 9 September, Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/international/africa/powell-declares-genocide-in-sudan-in-bid-to-raise.html> [Accessed 10 January 2022].

[4] Eltahir, Nafisa (2022) ‘More than 15,000 People Displaced in New Darfur Violence, UN Says’, Reuters, 27 January, Available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/more-than-15000-people-displaced-new-darfur-violence-un-says-2022-01-27> [Accessed 14 January 2022].

[5] Borger, Julia (2007) ‘Darfur Conflict Heralds Era of Wars Triggered by Climate Change, UN Report Warns’, The Guardian, 23 June, Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/23/sudan.climatechange> [Accessed 18 January 2022].

[6] International Peace Institute (2017) ‘Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Darfur: Toward Strategic, Prioritized, and Sequenced Mandates’, June, Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1706_Applying-HIPPO-to-Darfur.pdf> [Accessed 22 January 2022].

[7] OCHA (2021) ‘Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot – July 2021’, 8 August, Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Sudan_Humanitarian_Snapshot_Jul_2021_EN.pdf> [Accessed 25 January 2022].

[8] Sova, Chase (2017) ‘The First Climate Change Conflict’, World Food Program USA, 30 November, Available at: <https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/the-first-climate-change-conflict> [Accessed 28 January 2022].

[9] Ki-moon, Ban (2007) op. cit.

[10] UNEP (2007) Sudan Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, Nairobi: UNEP, Available at: <https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sudan.pdf> [Accessed 1 February 2022].

[11] UN Sudan Office of the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (2010) ‘Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-term Trends and Priorities for UN Agencies in Darfur’, September, Available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6AAEE62B2DC5EE8D852577AE0071F8E7-Full_Report.pdf> [Accessed 2 February 2022].

[12] Elzarov, Zurab (2021) ‘People on the Move: Addressing Vulnerabilities of Nomadic Communities in Darfur’, International Journal of Social Science and Economics, 1(2), 16–24, Available at: <http://www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/ijsse/article/view/4198/4664> [Accessed 4 February 2022].

[13] Amnesty International (2021) ‘Sudan: Horrific Attacks on Displacement Camps Show UN Peacekeepers Still Needed in Darfur’, March, Available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2021/03/sudan-horrific-attacks-on-displacement-camps-show-in-darfur> [Accessed 7 February 2022].

[14] Rijal, Emadeldin (2012) ‘Fuel-Efficient Stoves Protect Women, Environment’, Voices of Dafur, November, 3(8), 19–21, Available at: <https://issuu.com/vodarfur/docs/vod_november_2012_en> [Accessed 10 February 2022].

[15] Elzarov, Zurab (2018) ‘Protecting the Environment and Women in Darfur Through Fuel-Efficient Stoves’, Conflict Trends, 4, 30–37, Available at: <https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/protecting-the-environment-and-women-in-darfur-through-fuel-efficient-stoves> [Accessed 13 February 2022].

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Natural Resource (In)justice, Conflict and Transition Challenges in Africa: Lessons from the Niger Delta https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/natural-resource-injustice-conflict-and-transition-challenges-in-africa-lessons-from-the-niger-delta/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=natural-resource-injustice-conflict-and-transition-challenges-in-africa-lessons-from-the-niger-delta Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:08:20 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39703 Natural resource transformation is required to curb resource injustice and conflict in post-amnesty contexts such as the Niger Delta.

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Introduction

The term ‘natural resource (in)justice’ has been used in various contexts by various scholars. Contemporary resource justice scholarship highlights several different areas of debate, including power and inequality in resource access, control, ownership, greening, eco-efficiency, feminist ecology, resource transparency, just transitions,[1] resource equity, resource rights, and fairness with regards to global inequality in North/South natural resource policies.[2] Resource injustice underlines two dynamic and interwoven contexts. First, there is the anthropogenic context, which examines the adverse effects of natural resource extraction on humans, including exclusion, degradation, inequality, and unfair treatment in natural resource allocation. Second, there is the eco-centric context, which explores the adverse effects of natural resource extraction on the ecosystem or the natural environment.

The broader terrain within which natural resource justice is being pursued is rapidly changing. With the rise of natural resource justice movements, new ecological threats, the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic, and lethal feedback with deleterious capitalist resource extraction in the global South, resource justice is confronted with new challenges, notably resource conflict.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a considerable and increasing number of studies on natural resource conflict, including on questions of resource appropriation or what has become known in resource conflict debates as the ‘resource curse’, which points out the paradox of poverty among resource-rich countries.[3] Conflict and poverty are intertwined. In 2013, 471 million people lived in fragile and conflict-affected countries, while 78% of the world’s poor lived in these countries (181 million people).[4] Natural resources – land, water, forests, air – are essential to life on Earth.[5] Natural resource conflict accounts for the incompatibility of goals in natural resource use or appropriation. The rural poor in developing countries remain the most vulnerable, as they directly depend on natural resources for their food and livelihood security, while the livelihoods of 2.5 billion people depend wholly or partly on agriculture.[6] The dynamics of fair and equitable resource allocation in contexts associated with resource injustice are largely unknown. This is true especially where the resource-bearing local population is either marginalised or excluded in decision-making processes regarding natural resources.

Oil resource rich countries experience varying degrees of resource conflicts. Here, a tanker truck with stolen refined petroleum product was set ablaze in Rivers State, Nigeria (29 January 2022). PHOTO: REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE

The ascendancy of resource transparency in global discourses following the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) led to the emergence of natural resource-focused concepts, such as resource accounting and transparency. Unlike resource-specific forms of injustice, these concepts tend to cut across various sectors in understanding the drivers of resource appropriation and related asymmetries. In recent years, several scholars have argued, nevertheless, that debates on resource extraction remain overly normative and less transformative.[7]

There are equally divergent perspectives on resource-centric concepts (such as food, forests, water and land). The appropriation of the concept ‘greening’ has accounted for the expansion of capitalist resource exploitation, including land grabbing and broader themes accounting for resource vulnerability.[8] Land grabbing debates demonstrate the extent to which capitalist appropriation of land has undermined the existence and survival of agrarian communities, including food shortages and insecurity.[9]

Yet, the meaning, scope and practical implications of natural resource justice are still contested, reflecting the fact that the causes and effects of resource conflict, as well as efforts to tackle it, continue to raise new concerns with regards to transparency, equity and justice. In natural resource dialogues, there has been increasing attention to issues of resource transparency, inequality and the justice implications of various approaches to resource appropriation, including pollution, degradation, emissions and ecological implications.

Broadly, the wider landscape within which natural resource conflict is situated brings new challenges to the understanding and practice of post-transition peacebuilding. Natural resources abound in Africa (see Figure 1). However, evidence accumulates regarding social, ecological and environmental injustices accounting for conflicts. For instance, oil resource rich countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and South Sudan, and mineral producers such as South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique and Zambia experience varying degrees of resource conflicts. The extent to which fair and equitable practices are adopted in natural resource appropriation remains contestable. There has been a much-needed policy shift to issues of resource conflict as the causes of resource conflict across Africa are diverse. Such conflict scenarios highlight the need to move from resource conflict generally to issues of resource justice in particular, rooted in power and asymmetry in access and control of natural resources.

This article takes stock of existing scholarship and research on diverse understandings of the natural resource justice debate and examines the Niger Delta context. The theoretical framework draws from conflict transformation theory which posits that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes or identity. Rather the issues of contention could be restructured to meet the demands of conflicting parties and build relationships that extend beyond the particular conflict.[10]

The article examines post-conflict transition challenges in Africa drawing on lessons from post amnesty Niger Delta. It argues that while there is considerable and diverse studies on natural resource conflict and its resolution, including questions of post-conflict peacebuilding, issues of resource justice in post amnesty transition have been in the margins of academic debates, particularly its meaning, scope and practical implications. It demonstrates that natural resource injustice has been a central issue, which accounts for tensions and post conflict crises. It posits that there is a disconnect between academic and policy treatments of the subject of natural resource justice and shows that policies supporting resource justice will provide a stronger integration of equity, social and distributive justice and thus, resolve resource conflicts sustainably. Based on the existing perspectives, the article proposes transformative resource justice, a research agenda centred on resource conflict transformation, placing analysis on justice, equity and fairness as central to resource conflict transformation.

Figure 1: Mapping of Several Key Natural Resources in Africa[11]

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA

Oil Resource (In)justice in the Niger Delta

It is important to understand the specific context of the Niger Delta in which natural resource injustice occurs and which accounts for protracted resource conflict. Studies on resource conflict in the Niger Delta have rarely linked their arguments to resource injustice, such as oil resource or energy injustice.[12]

The Niger Delta is an oil-rich coastal area in South-South Nigeria, which extends over about 70 000 km2 (27 000 sq. mi) and makes up 7.5% of Nigeria’s landmass.[13] Oil from the region is the main foreign exchange earner for Nigeria. The region has fertile land and rural communities engage in various economic activities, such as fishing and farming. Land and resources are communally owned and traditionally recognised by prior occupation. The community shares access to land rights, rivers, creeks, and agricultural proceeds from these lands and water sources belong to those who use them.

Although in 1956 crude oil was found by Shell in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, a community in Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta, resource justice was not an initial focus in oil extraction by transnational oil companies (TNOCs) operating in the area. This is largely a result of a poor institutional framework that could not hold TNOCs accountable to the oil-bearing communities.

Oil exploitation and exploration in much of the 1970s and 1980s was largely informed by a profit motive, which undermined ecological justice and fair, transparent and equitable practices. Oil extraction became a major source of environmental pollution and a marker of communal violence, as various communities have been in conflict over oil rents.[14] The natural ecosystem became increasingly degraded by land and water pollution. In several Niger Delta communities, such as Nsikak Ogale, Bodo, Ogbe Ijaw, Egbema, and Jones Creek, among others, livelihood vulnerability has been evident due to oil spills in the creeks and farmland.[15]

Crude oil was found in 1956 by Shell, in commercial quantities in Oloibiri, a community in Bayelsa State in the Niger Delta. PHOTO: RHYS THOM

Meanwhile, fish stocks have increasingly declined and forest resources decimated as a result of prospecting for oil by TNOCs. In Eket, Akwa Ibom State, where Mobil is operating, farmland and livelihoods have damaged in some populated areas. The land is unfertile and cannot be used for agricultural cultivation. In Bodo in Rivers State, a United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) report describes land and water contamination.[16] In January 2021, Ogbeijaw, a community near Warri, was polluted by an oil spill, which covered and destroyed 21 hectares of farmland and food crops.[17]

Aside from land pollution, the water also remains polluted, which should be a source of livelihoods for fishers and the larger community. Presently, several fishing communities experience livelihood vulnerability as their means of subsistence is undermined by water polluted by oil. Most affected is Oyorokoto fishing community in Rivers State. Water samples from the Ogoni communities in Rivers State were found to have low pH levels, making them acidic and capable of solubilising heavy metals.[18] This has serious consequences for human health. Abandoned oil sites in Bodo have long-term damaging impacts on rivers and their surrounding fields because of the build-up of acidic chemicals. Acidic oil pollution affects surface and underground water. This type of pollution continues long after oil sites are closed or abandoned, and the water that leaches into the ecosystem is frequently acidic, poisonous to humans, and kills aquatic creatures.[19] It constitutes a major ecological security threat and serious risk to oil-bearing communities.

The steady rise in the sea level affects most Niger Delta communities, including Nembe and Brass in Bayelsa State. It impacts a wide area and continues to destroy the ecosystem. Most of the affected communities are inundated because of the rising sea level caused by dredging and capitalist oil resource appropriation by TNOCs.

There are several health implications of unjust resource extraction by TNOCs. This includes health hazards associated with water, soil and air pollution. Contamination of water, soil and air contributes to increased toxic build-up in people’s bodies. Gas flaring is a health hazard in parts of the region, including as a result of consequent high temperatures. Vulnerable groups, such as girls, women and the elderly, are most affected. Women are particularly impacted as they are responsible for maintaining family upkeep. In most communities in the region, women are breadwinners and are vulnerable to environmental hazards arising from capitalist oil resource exploitation. As such, women have to carry the burden of ill health arising from environmental destruction and pollution due to oil resource exploitation. They are exposed to toxic fumes from oil spills, acid rain, and heat from gas flaring.

The natural ecosystem has increasingly been degraded by land and water pollution. PHOTO: UCHEKE

A major consequence of the environmental hazards of oil resource appropriation is livelihood vulnerability. Soil contamination has ruined land that was cultivated by oil-bearing communities, undermining farming livelihoods. Cassava farms along riverbanks have been damaged by dredging. Farmers have lost their crops to land pollution. Fishers have lost their livelihood to oil pollution. Some communities have lost entire livelihoods to oil exploitation. Traditional fishing is no longer possible in polluted rivers.

Capitalist oil resource prospecting, exploration and appropriation, as well as deforestation, oil spills, inundation, and gas flaring, have dislocated the livelihoods of indigenous oil-bearing communities, and displaced them from their ancestral lands. Thus, TNOCs have denied indigenous communities their means of survival, including rights to ownership and control of land and resources.

Loss of biodiversity, flora and fauna due to resource injustice is evident. Not only is the general biodiversity damaged, several plant and animal species are either scarce or extinct. Once-common river birds and tree species have disappeared. Among the bird species rarely seen are the Okwa (indigenous partridge)and several river birds. Similarly, trees such as the Ngala in creeks, which are a habitat for much of the fish stock, have also been lost. There is invasion by an alien plant species, the Nypha palm. Periwinkles are threatened by oil pollution in the creeks. Shrimp, crayfish, Ngolo fish, and eels are in very short supply. The decimation of aquatic animals destabilises the natural ecosystem and undermines the subsistence of the local communities who rely on their natural environment for survival.

Additional impacts of resource injustice are the violation of the collective ecological rights of oil-bearing communities and environmental insecurity is a common feature of oil resource extraction in the region. Communities are displaced from their land and waters, the basis of their subsistence and survival. The experience of the Bodo community affected by massive soil contamination, pollution, and disruption of fishing and agricultural activities remains evident. In 2011, the UNEP reported that it will take 25 to 30 years for an effective clean-up of the Ogoni community polluted by oil from the activities of Shell.[20]

Acidic oil pollution affects surface and underground water, constitutes a major ecological security threat, and is a serious risk to oil-bearing communities. PHOTO: REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE

Oil Resource (In)justice and the Rise of Militancy

From the mid to late 2000s, various militia groups started to mobilise around the issue of ‘resource transparency and justice,’ such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Niger Delta Vigilante, and Niger Delta Strike Force (NDSF), among others. The violent agitations and ‘transformative-oriented’ understanding of resource justice draws from the notion of marginalisation and injustice. In the late 2000s, widespread militia resistance accounted for a decline in oil production and export from Nigeria, forcing multinational oil companies to gradually withdraw from exploration, particularly offshore. While some oil companies were shut down, others continued to operate.

Following the rise of militant groups, there emerged violent agitation on rights-based and resource appropriation discourse which drew attention to vulnerable groups most affected by oil resource exploitation and led to wider critique of oil resource politics. Militant groups contributed to shaping resource access, use and the dynamics of control in local contexts and within various resource-bearing communities. Thus, there has been increasing influence on local articulations of resource injustice(s) following violent attacks, disruption of crude oil and gas installations, kidnappings of expatriate oil workers for ransom, and so on. The militants pursued the war within the plains, forests and creeks of the region. Their activities reduced the daily output of crude oil production from 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2004 to 0.80 million bpd in the first quarter of 2009.[21]

Most resource justice movements and academic debates converge around the issues of:

  1. Injustice that characterised post-1990 asymmetrical resource extraction, connecting demands for fair and equitable ecological responses to overall lethal outcomes of environmental resource appropriation, such as pollution associated with TNOCs;
  2. Demands for an equitable resource allocation formula from the federal government to recognise the rights of resource-bearing communities; and
  3. The rise of resource control and demands for more inclusive and participatory resource appropriation.

The militants’ grievances include neglect by the federal government, loss of control over their resources, marginalisation in the oil economy and within the Nigerian federation, and militarisation and repression through military and security agencies. In relation to the TNOCs, the Niger Delta people protest against environmental pollution, mistreatment, poor compensation practices, poor benefits, unfulfilled promises, failures to implement memoranda of understanding, and inadequate employment and representation.[22] Other issues of agitation are poverty, deprivation, high youth unemployment and hopelessness, the takeover of oil benefits and oil blocks by non-indigenes of the Niger Delta, and the location of TNOCs head offices outside the Niger Delta.

Traditional fishing is not possible in polluted rivers. PHOTO: MARTEN VAN DIJL/ MILIEUDEFENSIE

Post-amnesty Conflict and Transition Challenges

The Federal Government of Nigeria introduced an amnesty programme in the Niger Delta in October 2009, also known as the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP). This decision was as a result of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ arising from the decline in crude oil production due to the activities of the militants. The objective of the PAP was to place the Niger Delta on the path of conflict resolution, peace-building, stability, and conflict transformation.[23] The PAP has four phases, commencing with pardoning the militants to enable voluntary renunciation of militancy, followed by disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR). The phases were designed for the reorientation of ex-militants to facilitate their adjustment to normal life. They were trained in groups in different skills and entrepreneurship in the orientation and rehabilitation camp in Obubra Cross River State.[24]

Disarmament involves the physical removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons, ammunition), and sometimes of the civilian population, as well as strengthening responsible arms management[25] to protect a given locality and show the cessation of violence. Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed groups, and their reorientation through programmes in certain designated locations. Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants, civilian associates, civil communities, victims of war, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are reabsorbed into society through training, employment, education, and economic empowerment programmes.[26]

Following the PAP, 30 000 ex-militants were disarmed, demobilised, and reintegrated into society. A considerable number graduated from training programmes.[27] Over 9 192 have graduated from the skills programme in various fields, including welding and fabrication, as well as 66 aeroplane and helicopter pilots, and 61 aviation maintenance engineers.[28]

However, resource equity problems continued in the Niger Delta in the post-amnesty period and the crisis persisted. Agitations against unfair treatment in terms of the engagement of ex-militants in sustainable livelihoods and irregular payment of their monthly stipends as well as confrontations, riots, demonstrations, and youth agitation have occurred. There are pervasive violent conflicts, an arms race, and continued insecurity in the region culminating in the resurgence of post-amnesty militancy.

In 2016, new militant groups emerged, claiming to represent the grievances of local oil-bearing communities. These groups include the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), Red Scorpions, Niger Delta Greenland Justice Movement (NDGJM), and the Bayan-Men. They renewed attacks on the region’s oil infrastructure, resulting in a reduction in Nigeria’s oil production from 2.2 million bpd to about 1.1 million bpd in 2016.[29]

In November 2021, the Bayan-Men blew up an oil facility operated by the Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) in Ogba-Egbema-Ndoni Local Government area of Rivers State. The angry militants who destroyed oil well OB5 (Obiavu-5), accused the oil multinational of failing to deal directly with the host communities and they insisted that they were fighting for justice for their people.[30]

Armed members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), speed away from the militia’s camp in the Niger Delta (September 2008). PHOTO: PIUS UTOMI EKPEI/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Conclusion: Towards Transformative Resource Justice

The article has located resource conflict in post-amnesty contexts with a focus on resource injustice as a major cause of its resurgence. Resource inequality, asymmetry and marginalisation need to be confronted and transformed. Amnesty without justice does not lead to success. What is largely seen as neglect of transformative approaches to resource justice in the Niger Delta is an attribute of the degree of State commitment to distributive and ecological justice, whereby the human ecosystem could be preserved. Natural resource transformation requires political power transformation and a change in the orientation of powerful incumbent actors that benefit from the dominant political economy of capitalist resource asymmetry.

Studies seeking to align amnesty with transformation of the Niger Delta must understand the complex terrain in which exclusionary policies continue to undermine resource justice and transformation of the region. For instance, whether the federal government has implemented the clean-up of the environmentally degraded Ogoni community, as recommended in the 2011 UNEP report, needs to be investigated. It is not enough to grant amnesty. The issue of concern is whether the government has been sincere in resolving the problems that triggered militancy and violent resource conflict. Inclusive and just responses from the federal government would be very valuable in resolving post-amnesty conflict. For example, why has the level of youth unemployment and poverty remained high in such an oil-rich region? Bayan-Men claim that resource injustice is the central cause of their grievance. Post-amnesty conflicts and transition challenges require new policy responses.

Thus, issues of resource transformation through transparency, accountability and ecological justice are imperative. While concerns on issues of justice are often mentioned in policy documents, concerted efforts are required to ensure the implementation of resource justice and resource transparency among vulnerable oil-bearing communities. Despite recent attention to natural resource extraction, transformative resource justice remains a challenge. There is a need to engage with novel and innovative participatory approaches to hear the voices and encourage participation of marginalised oil-bearing communities as dialogue and mediation are key peace-building mechanisms.

Resource justice has a diverse historical trajectory, but it is typically understood either as justice in relation to access or control of natural resources and its impacts, or as justice regarding the effects of natural resource appropriation. Such effects include all forms of environmental degradation and security threats. Some point to the vulnerability component of resource injustice in which oil-bearing communities are exposed to polluted water, degraded land, carbon emissions, acid rain, gas flaring, and all their complex lethal effects. Also, several communities are denied access to natural resources on their lands and thus further marginalised, exploited and disadvantaged by capitalist resource injustice.

Thus, there are several challenges to post-amnesty transition in the Niger Delta. It appears that amnesty cannot be delivered in isolation from the pursuit of resource justice claims, perhaps especially in contexts where the ecological rights of oil-bearing communities must be addressed. There is a need to understand the various concerns of oil-bearing communities which align with resource justice. For example, how has the PAP addressed the reintegration of ex-combatants in terms of empowerment and job creation? What efforts are made to link resource justice with complex ecological vulnerabilities, including environmental degradation, gender justice, water and food justice, resource conflict prevention, and inequitable revenue allocation formula by the federal government, among others?

To build a transformative mechanism requires institutional capacity for peacebuilding. In this context, there is a need to strengthen several institutions, such as, civil society groups, faith-based organisations, and environmental activist groups to build transformative adaptation for sustainable peace. The failure to mitigate gas flaring, acid rain, deforestation, sea level rise, and water and land pollution by TNCs will continue to trigger agitation and resource conflict. To contain capitalist resource extraction-induced degradation requires concerted efforts as resource efficiency, distributive justice, and equity bring with it wide-ranging resource justice challenges among policy-makers and related stakeholders.

Dr Luke Amadi is a Guest Editor at Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK.

Endnotes

[1] Heffron, Raphael J. and McCauley, Darren (2018) ‘What is the “Just Transition”?’ Geoforum, 88, 74–77.

[2] Roberts, J. Timmon and Parks, Bradley (2006) A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics and Climate Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[3] Ross, Michael L. (2015) ‘What Have we Learned about the Resource Curse?’ Annual Review of Political Science, 18, 239–259.

[4] Gerszon Mahler, Daniel; Yonzan, Nishant; Hill, Ruth; Lakner, Christoph; Wu, Haoyu; and Yoshida, Nobuo (2022) ‘Pandemic, Prices, and Poverty’, World Bank Blog, 13 April, Available at: <https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/pandemic-prices-and-poverty> [Accessed 3 January 2022].

[5] Sweetman, Caroline and Ezpeleta, Maria (2017) ‘Introduction: Natural Resource Justice,’ Gender & Development, (25)3, 353–366.

[6] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2016) Statistical Yearbook of the Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome: FAO, Available at: <https://www.fao.org/food-agriculture-statistics/data-release/data-release-detail/en/c/1509352/> [Accessed 3 January 2022].

[7] Igwe, Prince and Amadi, Luke (2022) ‘Natural Resource Conflict and the Real Cause of the Resource Curse in Africa: A Political Economy Approach’, in Chereji, Christian-Radu; Pop, Adrian; and Sandu, Ciprian (eds), Conflict and Climate Change, Cluj-Napoca, Romania: Accent Publishers, pp. 131–150.

[8] Fairhead, James; Leach, Melissa; and Scoones, Ian (2012) ‘Green Grabbing: A New Appropriation of Nature?’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 237–261.

[9] Wise, Timothy A. (2021) Eating Tomorrow: Agribusiness, Family Farmers, and the Battle for the Future of Food, New York: The New Press.

[10] Miall, Hugh (2004) ‘Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task’, in Austin, Alex; Fischer, Martina; and Ropers, Norbert (eds), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 67–89.

[11] Dearden, Nick (2017) ‘Africa is Not Poor, We are Stealing its Wealth’, Al Jazeera, 24 May, Available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/5/24/africa-is-not-poor-we-are-stealing-its-wealth> [Accessed 3 January 2022].

[12] Sovacool, Benjamin K. and Dworkin, Michael H. (2014) Global Energy Justice: Problems, Principles and Practices, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

[13] Otoabasi, Akpan (2011) The Niger Delta Question and the Peace Plan, Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books.

[14] Amadi, Luke; Imoh-Ita, Imoh; and Ogbanga, Mina (2016) ‘Exploring Knowledge Management and Green Corporate Strategy (GCS) Nexus’, International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research, 4(1), 66–82.

[15] UNEP (2011) ‘Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland’, Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, Available at: <https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/01_fwd_es_ch01_UNEP_OEA.pdf> [Accessed 3 January 2022].

[16] Ibid.

[17] Egwu, Patrick (2021) ‘Nigerian Farming Communities Win Landmark Court Ruling Against Shell’, Available at: https://www.ncronline.org/news/earthbeat/nigerian-farming-communities-win-landmark-court-ruling-against-shell [Accessed 7 January 2022].

[18] Ibid.

[19] UNEP (2011), op. cit.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Etepke, Ambily (2012) ‘Review Peace and Development in Nigeria: The Amnesty Experience in the Niger Delta of Nigeria’, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 4(6), 94–102.

[22] Ikelegbe, Austine (2005) ‘The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria’, Nordic Journal of African Studies, 14(2), 208–234.

[23] Kuku, Kingsley (2013) ‘Nigeria Enlists 30,000 Ex-militants in Presidential Amnesty Programme’, Premium Times, 1 December, Available at: http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/112493-nigeria enlists-30,000-ex-militants-in [Accessed 4 January 2022].

[24] Vurasi, Serebe S. and Amadi, Okechukwu S. (2020) ‘Beyond Rhetoric: Amnesty Programme and Peace Building in Post Conflict Niger Delta’, Discovery, 56(296), 417–432.

[25] UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (2016). Available at: <https://www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf> [Accessed 3 January 2022].

[26] Ikelegbe, Austine (2005) op. cit.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ebiede, Tarila and Langer, Amin (2017) ‘How Amnesty Efforts in the Niger Delta Triggered New Violence’, The Conversation,8 March, Available at: <https://theconversation.com/how-amnesty-efforts-in-the-niger-delta-triggered-new-violence-74085> [Accessed 5 January 2022].

[29] Ebiede, Tarila (2018) ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of Employment Programmes for Ex Combatants: A Case Study of Nigeria’s Post Amnesty Programme (PAP)’, IDS Bulletin, 49(5), 105–118.

[30] Odiegwu, Mike (2021) ‘Just In: Panic as Militants Blow up Agip Facility in Rivers State’, The Nation, 21 November, Available at: <https://thenationonlineng.net/just-in-panic-as-militants-blow-up-agip-facility-in-rivers> [Accessed 5 January 2022].

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Peacebuilding Policies and Frameworks in Kenya https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/peacebuilding-policies-and-frameworks-in-kenya/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=peacebuilding-policies-and-frameworks-in-kenya Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:06:28 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39690 Examination of Kenya’s peacebuilding policies and frameworks identifies gaps to be addressed in reducing conflict and enhancing the peace infrastructure.

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Introduction

Peacebuilding is both a contested and evolving concept,with no universally accepted definition.[1] Despite being a broadly fluid term without clear guidelines or goals, most scholars agree that the fundamental task of peacebuilding is to improve human security.[2] The term first emerged through Johan Galtung’s peace work. He advocated for the establishment of a peacebuilding system to stimulate long-lasting peace by finding a solution to sources of violent conflicts and enhancing local capacities for conflict resolution and peace management.[3] A report by Boutros Boutros-Ghali entitled ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping’ refers to peacebuilding as ‘an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflict’.[4] A peacebuilding agenda is critical in the realisation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which advocate for ‘peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.[5]

In the Kenyan context, peacebuilding activities and regulatory frameworks are recognised as vital processes and instruments that are necessary for the achievement of Vision 2030, which is the country’s new development blueprint that aims to transform Kenya into a new industrialising middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizen by 2030. On the one hand, the peacebuilding, conflict management, and security strategy of the political pillar of Vision 2030 underscores the need for promoting peacebuilding and reconciliation, deepening policies and legal and institutional frameworks that promote order in society, as well as institutionalising dialogue between and among communities to promote harmony among racial, ethnic and other interest groups. On the other hand, the social pillar aims at establishing ‘a just and cohesive society that enjoys equitable social development in a clean and secure environment’.[6]

Nyambura Githaiga observes that from a cursory glance, Kenya is not an immediate or apparent choice for a peacebuilding case study.[7] This can be attributed to the fact that peacebuilding studies primarily focus on nations that experienced highly destructive and horrific civil wars and require international intervention. However, Kenya has suffered intermittent and localised destructive conflicts, such as the 1992, 1997, and 2007-2008 election-based violence. Therefore, Kenya offers a peacebuilding case study which is not related to civil war, but part of a tactical response to repeated incidents of local destructive conflicts.[8]

Kenya has suffered intermittent and localised destructive conflicts, such as election-based violence over the years. PHOTO: DEMOSH

In addition, chronic inter-ethnic, land, ideological, resource-based, cross-border, human-wildlife, and religious conflicts have become part of Kenyan society, thus undermining sustainable development, exacerbating ethnic enmity, and arousing political instability. Therefore, the need for peacebuilding processes towards finding concrete solutions to these conflicts cannot be overemphasised.

Despite remarkable steps taken by the Government of Kenya and other peacebuilding actors to lessen or prevent conflict occurrence, they are still frequent and intense. Government efforts include the establishment of peacebuilding policies, laws, and mechanisms, among others. This raises a fundamental question: Are existing peacebuilding policies and frameworks which include, but are not limited to, the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, National Cohesion and Integration Act No. 12 of 2008, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 6 of 2008, and the National Action Plan on Arms Control and Management, effective? Without doubt, there exist critical gaps in policy and institutional and legislative frameworks that require concrete action.

This article, therefore, examines the existing policies and legal frameworks for peacebuilding with the aim of identifying existing gaps that affect the peacebuilding process in Kenya. Careful examination of these instruments can provide useful information needed to strengthen critical regulatory frameworks and enhance conflict management and peacebuilding efforts in Kenya.

The Kenyan judiciary plays a crucial role in the resolution of various disputes through official means. PHOTO: REUTERS/MONICAH MWANGI

Peacebuilding Policies, Legal Frameworks, and Existing Gaps in Kenya

This section deliberates various practices as well as policy and legal frameworks that are essential to peacebuilding in Kenya. It also identifies existing gaps within the policy and legal documents.

The Constitution of Kenya (2010)

A key peacebuilding policy and legal framework is the Constitution of Kenya[9] which clearly outlines a number of stakeholders, such as the judiciary, that have a crucial role in the conflict management and peacebuilding architecture. The preamble to the Constitution underscores the aspiration for Kenyans to live peacefully and in harmony as one undividable, independent nation, irrespective of existing religious, ethnic and cultural diversity.

The advancement of durable peace and security is embodied in the Constitution. Article 238 refers to national security as ‘the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability and prosperity, and other national interests’.[10] Conflicts are examples of threats to peace and stability which peacebuilding efforts seek to resolve.

With a robust provision that promotes tolerance for diversity, equity, inclusion, and equality, the Constitution creates a platform for addressing challenges that can generate conflict and weaken national cohesion. For example, the Kenyan Constitution promotes the establishment of a devolved system of government which addresses the unequal distribution of economic and political resources that may cause conflicts. Also, it offers opportunities to strengthen platforms, mechanisms, and tools to consolidate progress made in the areas of national cohesion, integration, and peacebuilding and conflict management.[11]

Furthermore, Chapter 10 of the Kenyan Constitution offers salient provisions for the judiciary, including the establishment of the Court of Appeals, High Court, and Supreme Court, which play a crucial role in the resolution of various disputes through official means. In addition, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms critical for conflict resolution are clearly articulated in Article 159 of the Constitution. This article outlines other options for dispute resolution, such as Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (TDRMs), reconciliation, arbitration, and mediation.[12] While TDRMs, which operate outside the formal legal framework, play a vital role in the resolution of disputes through informal methods, there limited legal frameworks exist to guide their operations due to their informality.[13]For example, the Maslaha system is an informal TDRM exercised by Somali communities in dispute settlement through elders. While the Maslaha system is mostly preferred by these local communities, it has some notable pitfalls, such as unfair rulings, final decisions based on cultural rules which may contradict the Constitution, as well as difficulty in distinguishing what constitutes criminal and civil cases. In addition, the courts are perceived to be focused more on communal relationships at the expense of victims’ needs, who should be at the centre of dispute resolution.[14]

Equally important is Chapter 11 of the Constitution, which articulates the importance of:

  1. County governments in promoting national unity;
  2.  Marginalised and minority groups’ rights and interest protection;
  3.  Economic and social development and advancement; and
  4.  Equitable distribution of resources among people.[15]
Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms operate outside the formal legal framework and play a vital role in the resolution of disputes through informal methods. PHOTO: ELISA FINOCCHIARO

The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (2015)

The National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, embraced by the legislature on 27 August 2015, is a product of the review process described in Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014.[16]This Policy is a collective effort by the Government of Kenya and relevant stakeholders to guarantee stability and create a long-lasting solution to violent conflicts. It provides a mechanism for coordination and synergy-building among key stakeholders involved in peacebuilding and conflict management. It also offers a regulatory framework for resource allocation to government-driven peace interventions that ensure real-time responses to conflict issues.[17]

The six pillars that are central to the realisation of the overall goal of the National Policy include mediation and preventive diplomacy, capacity building, post-conflict recovery and stabilisation, institutional frameworks, traditional conflict prevention and mitigation.[18]

While this policy was intended to offer guidance on the activities of peacebuilding actors, the key challenge lies in its gradual implementation. There is an absence of functional laws for the execution and operationalisation of the National Peacebuilding Policy.[19]To anchor the policy in law, the National Cohesion and Peace Building Bill was first developed in 2016. Despite completing the public consultation process, the Bill remains stuck at the ministerial level and awaits presentation to Parliament by the Cabinet for approval.[20]This, to a greater extent, restricts partnership, networking and coordination among key peacebuilding stakeholders, including civil society. Even though the policy has been utilised as a basis for establishing peace committees at the county level, it has not been systematically rolled out. There is limited ownership of peacebuilding efforts at community and county level due to the inadequate, devolved power and resources. The National Government, private sector, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the capital city of Nairobi largely spearhead peacebuilding activities and hence they are usually centrally driven.[21]

The National Cohesion and Integration Act was created in response to the 2007-2008 electoral violence that resulted in massive loss of lives and livelihoods. PHOTO: URIEL SINAI/GETTY IMAGES

The National Cohesion and Integration Act No. 12 of 2008

The formulation of the National Cohesion and Integration Act was driven by the need to inspire national cohesion and integration by prohibiting ethnic-based discrimination. The Act was created in response to the 2007-2008 electoral violence that resulted in massive loss of lives and livelihoods.

The Act gave rise to the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), whose fundamental role is ‘to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony, and peaceful coexistence between persons of different racial and ethnic backgrounds in Kenya and to advise the government with recommendations on possible interventions’.[22]

More recently, the National Cohesion and Peace Building Bill of 2021 was introduced in the Senate, to repeal the Act and rename the NCIC to the National Cohesion and Peacebuilding Commission, with the core mandate of creating a synchronised structure for cohesion and peacebuilding in the country. It is envisaged that the Bill will empower the Commission to tame ‘hate mongers’ or perpetrators of hate speech.[23]

While the NCIC Act was established to strengthen national cohesion and integration among Kenyans and contain hate speech, it is yet to achieve substantial success. The NCIC has been criticised for being a ‘toothless institution’ without the capacity to tame inciters and hate mongers, among others.[24] The NCIC has restricted powers of enforcement and the Act only empowers the Commission to probe racial- and ethnic-based discrimination complaints, and subsequently provide the Attorney-General with recommendations. Despite making crucial recommendations for the prosecution of unruly politicians accused of hate speech as per the law, there have been few, if any, successful prosecutions, notwithstanding substantial evidence of hate speech against accused persons.[25] In addition, there is a lack of political goodwill to promote national cohesion among the political class, and yet they are the main stakeholders.[26] Another weakness of the Act is that it largely concentrates on ethnicity, thus neglecting other target groups for hate speech.[27]

A report on the elimination of all forms of racial discriminationby the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) reveals that while the Act robustly articulates what hate speech entails, there is no clarification on the factors that should be considered when gauging the severity of hate speech and identifying instances that require intervention.[28]

Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act No. 6 of 2008

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act provides for the formation of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The mandate of the TJRC includes the advancement of peace, national unity, justice, healing, and reconciliation among Kenyans through establishing complete and precise historical data of human rights abuses.

In 2013, the final TJRC report was delivered to the Government of Kenya. The report documented widespread violations of human rights, including injustices under British rule from 1895 to 1963 as well as under independent Kenyan governments, including post-election violence (2007-2008).[29]

It was hoped that full implementation of the recommendations in the TDRJ report would to a large extent address the persistent structural violence drivers in the country. However, an in-depth and critical review of the report published by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) in 2014 observes that despite ethnicity being flagged as a significant factor in the 2007-2008 election violence, the TJRC report did not sufficiently make robust and policy-relevant recommendations geared towards addressing the ethnic factors that contribute significantly to election violence and have resulted in the deaths of approximately 1 133 people and the displacement of 600 000 individuals during election-related violence.[30]

In addition, the lack of adequate political will to support the execution of the objectives of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act and the lack of sufficient resources to run its operations, which has forced the Commission to seek loans, are also major obstacles.[31]

The National Action Plan on Arms Control and Management (2006)

The Kenya National Focal Point (KNFP) on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) was formed in 2002 to accomplish Kenya’s mandate as a Nairobi Protocol signatory. The Protocol is a pact among 11 States in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region on SALW threat reduction, prevention and control.[32]

The KNFP developed the National Action Plan(NAP) on Arms Control and Management, now known as the Strategic Plan, on SLAW in 2006. The NAP consists of a broad set of actions geared towards taming the spread of illicit SALW, including through capacity development, among other actions.[33] While the KNFP has produced a draft national SALW control and management policy, the policy and NAP seem not to have been given the necessary attention by relevant stakeholders in terms of fast-tracking its finalisation and operationalisation. In addition, the disarmament process, which is not widely acceptable to communities, can also be politicised.[34]

While the NAP plays a vital role in curbing SALW, which constitutes a threat to the sustainability of peacebuilding activities, it still faces a lack of adequate financial resources required for the execution of established activities and realisation its objectives. The plan is also geared towards building the capacity of relevant security and civil society stakeholders as a prerequisite action for its successful implementation; however, capacity development is still low. As a result, the National Focal Points (NFPs) struggle with inadequate staff, while the available NFP staff lack the relevant skill sets for the multiplicity of tasks required. The skill sets required include, but are not limited to, research, resource mobilisation, project management, and drafting evidence-based policy recommendations. NFP coordinators are also frequently under-resourced and over-stretched and thus struggle to carry out their roles.[35]

Kenyan police burn a pile of assorted, illicit small firearms and light weapons in Nairobi’s Uhuru Gardens, Kenya (March 2009). UN PHOTO/TIM MCKULKA

Conclusion and Recommendations

Kenya has made significant strides in developing relevant peacebuilding policies and legal frameworks that are geared towards creating a just, cohesive, and peaceful society. However, a review of the existing peacebuilding policies, legal frameworks, and practices reveals the policy gaps that need to be addressed. It is clear that if the available peacebuilding practices, policies, and legal frameworks are implemented effectively, they would play a crucial role in reducing conflict incidences and enhancing peace. The adoption of a multi-agency approach is necessary for the successful implementation of all peacebuilding efforts.

Recommendations

  1. The Kenyan National Assembly and the Senate should prioritise the passing of a National Peacebuilding and Conflict Management Bill to anchor the policy in law. This will support the agenda of peacebuilding and conflict management in Kenya to a greater extent.
  2. The NCIC should be empowered with the requisite capacity to tame hate speech. The legislative arm of the government should fast-track the National Cohesion and Peace Building Amendment Bill into law. This will enable the NCIC to successfully prosecute hate speech.
  3. The formulation and approval of a legislative framework on the operation of ADR by Kenyan legislators will play a crucial role in providing much-needed guidance on the functioning of ADR in a way that does not violate human rights and/or contradicts the Constitution.
  4. Sufficient financial resources should be allocated to ensure effective implementation of peacebuilding policies, practices, and efforts by the Government of Kenya and relevant stakeholders.
  5. The Government of Kenya should employ adequate personnel with the prerequisite experience and skills to manage the NFP secretariats on a long-term basis. This will play a key role in addressing the challenge of staff limitations and skill gaps.

 In conclusion, the adoption of a whole society approach in peacebuilding efforts by the Government of Kenya is critical. Therefore, all relevant stakeholders, such as the private sector, NGOs, political and community leaders – who will play a useful role in filling existing gaps in peacebuilding policies and frameworks – and Kenyan citizens, should be brought on board. As a result, the peacebuilding infrastructure will be strengthened.

Sylvan Odidi is a Research Fellow at the Kenya School of Government in Nairobi.

Endnotes


[2] Hazen, Jennifer (2007) ‘Can Peacekeepers be Peacebuilders?’ International Peacekeeping, 14(3), 323–338.

[3] Galtung, Johan (1976) ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, and Peacebuilding’, Peace, War and Defense: Essays in Peace Research, 2(1), 297–298.

[4] Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1992) ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping’, International Relations, 11(3), 201–218.

[5] Whaites, Alan (2016) ‘Achieving the Impossible: Can We Be SDG 16 Believers?’ GovNet Background Paper No. 2, OECD, Available at: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effective-institutions/Achieving%20the%20Impossible%20can%20we%20be%20SDG16%20believers.pdf> p. 14.

[6] Government of Kenya (2007) Kenya Vision 2030: A Globally Competitive and Prosperous Kenya, Nairobi: Government of Kenya, p. xi.

[7] Githaiga, Nyambura (2020) ‘When Institutionalisation Threatens Peacebuilding: The Case of Kenya’s Infrastructure for Peace’, Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 15(3), 316–330.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Government of Kenya (2010) The Constitution of Kenya, 2010, Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting.

[10] Ibid, p. 144.

[11] Government of Kenya (2011) National Policy on Peace-building and Conflict Management, Nairobi: Office of the President, Available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a7ad25f4.html> [Accessed 27 January 2022].

[12] Government of Kenya (2010) op. cit.

[13] Mohamed, Zamzam and Muriithi, Peter M. (2020) ‘A Critical Analysis of Maslaha as a Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanism in North Eastern Kenya’, Journal of Conflict Management and Sustainable Development, 5(1).

[14] Abdi, Maryam (2016) ‘Assessment of Sexual and Gender Based Violence Reporting Procedures among Refugees in Camps in Dadaab, Kenya’, Doctoral dissertation, University of Nairobi.

[15] Wepundi, Manasseh and Ndung’u, James (2016) The 2030 Agenda: Supporting a More Peaceful Just and Inclusive Society in Kenya, London: Safer World.

[16] Frontier Counties Development Council (FCDC) and Drylands Learning and Capacity Building Initiative (DLCI) (2020) Analysis of the Institutional, Legal and Policy Framework or Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion in the FCDC Region, Nairobi: FCDC and DLCI.

[17] Osula, Mary (2015) ‘Finally! A Peace Policy for Kenya’, Safer World, 4 November,Available at: <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/news-and-analysis/post/174-finally-a-peace-policy-for-kenya> [Accessed 4 February 2022].

[18] Government of Kenya (2014) ‘Sessional Paper No. 5 of 2014 on National Policy for Peacebuilding and Conflict Management’, Nairobi: Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of National Government.

[19] Muragu, Michael and Mpaayei, Florence (2017) ‘Reflection Paper on Strengthening the Peacebuilding Sector in Kenya’, n.p.: Jamii Thabiti Project.

[20] FCDC and DLCI (2020) op. cit.

[21] Muragu, Michael and Mpaayei, Florence (2017) op. cit.

[22] NCIC (2018) Footprints of Peace, Consolidating National Cohesion in a Devolved Kenya 2014-2018, Nairobi: NCIC.

[23] Otieno, Julias (2021) ‘Bill Renames, Empowers “Toothless” NCIC in Bid to Tame Hate Mongers’, The Star, 6 July, Available at: <https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2021-07-06-bill-renames-empowers-toothless-ncic-in-bid-to-tame-hate-mongers> [Accessed 13 January 2022].

[24] Ibid.

[25] KNCHR (2017) ‘Alternative Report to the Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination’, March, Nairobi: KNCHR, Available at: <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CERD/Shared%20Documents/KEN/INT_CERD_IFN_KEN_27238_E.pdf> [Accessed 4 February 2022].

[26] Kenya Alliance of Residents Association (KARA) (2015) ‘National Cohesion: Kenya is at its Worst Security Index – NCIC Chairman Francis Ole Kaparo’, 22 January, Available at: <https://www.kara.or.ke/index.php/2015-01-22-08-51-09/kara-news/166-national-cohesion-kenya-is-at-its-worst-security-index-ncic-chairman-francis-ole-kaparo> [Accessed 23 January 2022].

[27] Busolo, Doreen and Ngigi, Samuel (2018) ‘Understanding Hate Speech in Kenya’, New Media and Mass Communication, 70, 43–49.

[28] KNCHR (2017) op. cit.

[29] Kenya Transitional Justice Network (KTJN) (2013) ‘Summary: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report’, Nairobi: KTJN.

[30] International Centre for Truth and Justice (ITCJ) (2014) ‘TJRC Final Report Deserves Serious Analysis and Action’, New York: ITCJ, Available at: <https://www.ictj.org/news/ictj-kenya-tjrc-final-report-deserves-serious-analysis-and-action> [Accessed 11 January 2022]; Mutahi, Patrick and Mutuma Ruteere (2019) ‘Violence, Security and the Policing of Kenya’s 2017 Elections’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 13(2), 253–271.

[31] Sum, Abigael (2013) ‘Team Cites Wrangles, Poor Funding as Some of the Obstacles Faced’, The Standard, 23 May, Available at: <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/kenya/article/2000084236/team-cites-wrangles-poor-funding-as-some-of-the-obstacles-it-faced> [Accessed on 10 February 2020].

[32] Githaiga, Nyambura (2020) op. cit.

[33] Government of Kenya (2006) Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management, Nairobi: Government of Kenya, Available at: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/124869/Kenya-National-Action-Plan-2006.pdf> [Accessed 10 February 2020].

[34] FCDC and DLCI (2020) op. cit.

[35] Ndung’u, James and Wepundi, Mannsseh (2011) ‘Controlling Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya and Uganda: Progress So Far’, Working Paper, May, Saferworld, Available at: <https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/565-controlling-small-arms-and-light-weapons-in-kenya-and-uganda>

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From Terrorism to Banditry: Mass Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/from-terrorism-to-banditry-mass-abductions-of-schoolchildren-in-nigeria/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=from-terrorism-to-banditry-mass-abductions-of-schoolchildren-in-nigeria Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:04:20 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39681 The ongoing crises of mass abductions of children in Nigeria challenges a reevaluation of responses by the government.

The post From Terrorism to Banditry: Mass Abductions of Schoolchildren in Nigeria appeared first on ACCORD.

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Introduction

Kidnapping in Nigeria is not a new phenomenon but has assumed an alarming dimension in recent times. Acts of kidnapping are increasingly perpetrated by different criminal elements, such as militias, gangs, ritualists, and terrorists, among others, for a variety of reasons. However, the increased frequency, geographical spread, and operational sophistication of kidnapping for ransom (K4R) is a major source of concern for individuals, organisations, the diplomatic community, and, indeed, the Nigerian Government. Much of the concern is about the safety of the victims as well as the cost of this expanding criminal enterprise. For instance, Nigeria’s main geopolitical intelligence platform, SBM Intelligence, estimated that between 2011 and 2020, Nigerians paid at least US$18.34 million (₦7 billion) in ransoms to kidnappers.[1] In the first half of 2021, 2 371 people were kidnapped and the sum of about US$23.84 million (N10 billion) was demanded in ransoms in Nigeria.[2]

The targets are as diverse as the actors who benefit from and the factors that underpin the upsurge in K4R. Expatriates, businesspeople, schoolchildren, women, politicians, government officials, diplomats, and traditional rulers, among others, are increasingly being targeted by criminal gangs.[3] The wanton predation on schoolchildren through mass abduction by armed groups that are ideologically or economically motivated is the latest worrisome trend in the pattern of criminal victimisation in Nigeria. This article examines the trajectory of the mass abduction of schoolchildren in northern Nigeria, highlighting the drivers of mass abduction and evaluating emerging responses by the government.

The Shifting Security Landscape and Trajectory of the Mass Abduction of Schoolchildren

Insecurity in northern Nigeria is the new normal. This is evidenced by vicious attacks on local communities and rampant kidnapping of people by criminal groups – terrorists and bandits. While the term ‘terrorism’ entails the premeditated use of violence by an ideologically motivated individual or group to create a general climate of fear in a population with the intention of bringing about a particular political objective, ‘banditry’ refers to economically motivated armed violence perpetrated by gangs driven primarily by the intention to extort, dispossess or plunder their targets – individuals, groups or communities.

Although terrorism and banditry are different forms of criminality, the distinction is increasingly blurred by a fluid modus operandi. Terrorists are known to have raided communities, looted property (foodstuff and livestock), and abducted civilians, while bandits are equally guilty of these acts, but they do not openly justify their activities on ideological grounds. The use of arms, whether crude or sophisticated, the motive to steal valuable assets, and deliberate abduction of people are common threads that bind these forms of violent criminality in Nigeria. The deployment of arms and kidnapping provide the link between terrorism and banditry, leading some analysts to contend that what is happening in northern Nigeria is terrorism thinly disguised as banditry.[4]

Whether they are referred to as terrorists or bandits, what has become more apparent is that criminal groups that engage in K4R in Nigeria have adopted different types of operational models. These include the routine, invasion, highway, insider, seduction, and feigned model. Figure 1 summarises these models. Terrorists and bandits have outraged the world with mass abductions of schoolchildren, especially in northern Nigeria, using the invasion model of operation.

Figure 1: Models of Kidnapping for Ransom Prevalent in Nigeria[5]

SOURCE: ONUOHA, FREEDOM (2021) ‘THREAT OF KIDNAPPING IN NIGARIA: SCALE DIMENSIONS, TRENDS AND DRIVERS’

The map in Figure 2 highlights the location of some notable mass abductions in the last few years. The kidnapping of over 270 girls from Chibok Secondary School on 14 April 2014 by Boko Haram insurgents was the curtain-raiser for the deliberate targeting of schoolchildren.[6] Another instance of terrorist mass abduction was the February 2018 raiding of the Government Girls Science and Technical College (GGSTC) in Yobe State by a faction of Boko Haram – the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP).[7]

Figure 2: Locations of Mass Abduction of Schoolchildren in Northern Nigeria[8]

SOURCE: AUTHORS’ MAPPING OF THE INCIDENTS OF MASS ABDUCTION IN NIGERIA REPORTED IN THE MEDIA

Recently, armed gangs loosely referred to as ‘bandits’ have increasingly relied on this tactic in imitation of Boko Haram terrorists to demand ransom money or the release of their members detained by security forces. The frequency and ease of operation have raised serious concerns over the vulnerability of schools and the future of education in northern Nigeria. On 17 February 2021, over 42 people were kidnapped by unknown gunmen from Government Science College in Niger State.[9] The attack signalled the spread of mass abduction of schoolchildren in the north central region.

Data collected indicates that about 1 548 schoolchildren have been abducted in 11 separate incidents of mass abduction by terrorists and bandits in northern Nigeria between April 2014 and June 2021.[10] Some of the schools that bandits have targeted in mass abductions include Bethel Baptist Secondary School, UBE Rama Primary School, Government Science Secondary School, and Federal College of Forestry Mechanization in Kaduna state; Government Girls Secondary School in Zamfara state; Government Science College in Niger state; Islamic school, and Government Science Secondary School in Katsina state. Most of the incidents took place during night-time hours and the victims were taken into forests, with the negotiations facilitated by third parties.

The mass abduction of students suggests significant logistical planning by the attackers. While the links between terrorists operating in the northeast and bandits rampaging the northwest remain uncertain, Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, claimed that his group was behind the abduction of the Kakara students in Katsina state on 11 December 2020.[11] This no doubt has heightened fears of possible ties between the armed groups.

Protesters march to the presidential villa, in Abuja, to deliver a protest letter to Nigeria’s President Goodluck Jonathan calling for the release of the 270 plus Nigerian schoolgirls in Chibok, who were kidnapped by Boko Haram (22 May 2014) PHOTO: REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE

Why the Rise in Mass Abduction of Schoolchildren?

Several interrelated factors account for the outbreak and rise of K4R in Nigeria, especially mass abduction. These factors derive from and reflect the crisis of the Nigerian political economy. Despite Nigeria’s enormous oil wealth, corruption and mismanagement of the national economy have resulted in widespread poverty, unemployment, and inequality. The youth, who are disproportionately affected, have resorted to crime.

In addition, the weakness of State institutions to resolve security challenges, such as the herdsmen-farmer clashes or cattle rustling, has led to the loss of livelihoods and assets. As a result, some affected or aggrieved individuals, who have lost assets and even confidence in State institutions, resort to criminality, such as banditry or kidnapping as a means of livelihood.

The continued payment of ransoms makes the criminal enterprise very lucrative, enticing private citizens and even security agents into joining the scheme. Ample evidence points to the connivance and complicity of State actors, such as military personnel, security agents, government officials, and local community leaders, in facilitating kidnapping operations, including supplying logistical support, weapons, and profiting  from ransoms paid  to terrorists and bandits.[12] This, in turn, has led to distrust between citizens and security forces and the collapse of intelligence-gathering.

Another relevant factor is the porosity of Nigerian borders, which has enabled the cross-border flow of weapons and criminal elements. Given Nigeria’s porous international and inter-state borders, arms traffickers can adopt various concealment methods to move arms from one location to another and avoid detection more easily. This has facilitated the infiltration of jihadi elements and their migration from one geo-political zone to another. Access to sophisticated weapons coupled with possible terrorist infiltration into the ranks of bandits has heightened the risk of mass abduction of schoolchildren.

The isolated nature and weak protective structures around schools in local communities add to the vulnerability of schoolchildren to mass abduction. For instance, it was reported that the perimeter fencing and entrance gate of the Government Science College, Kagara, were dilapidated, making it easy for the bandits to gain entrance. Conceivably, mismanagement of public resources is a major factor in the poor state of most schools that are vulnerable to attack in Nigeria.

The Safe Schools Initiative was launched in North-eastern Nigeria in May 2014 to bolster security in schools. PHOTO: GPE/KELLEY LYNCH

Responses to the Mass Abduction of Schoolchildren

The mass kidnapping of schoolchildren has attracted the attention of several critical stakeholders in security provision, particularly the Nigerian Federal and State Government. Some of the measures in response to mass abductions include the Safe School Initiative, rescue operations, back-door negotiation, peace deals and amnesty, and the closure of schools. These measures have recorded varying levels of success and challenges, as elaborated on in the next sections.

Safe Schools Initiative

In the aftermath of the Chibok abduction, a Safe Schools Initiative was launched in North-eastern Nigeria in May 2014 to bolster security in schools by erecting fences around them. It started with an investment from the Global Business Coalition for Education and was supported by the A World at School movement and funding from business leaders, government, and other donors. At least US$20m was pledged for the three-year project. Though most of the recent kidnappings have happened in the North West, which was not covered by the Safe Schools Initiative, the 2018 abduction of 110 Dapchi schoolgirls in Yobe state raised questions about the success of the initiative.[13] President Buhari’s administration has not prioritised this initiative, leading to calls by some stakeholders for it to be reinstituted. Even when prioritised for implementation, however, corruption and weak accountability mechanisms will probably undermine its effectiveness.

Bello Turji, a bandit leader, released 52 kidnapped victims as part of an effort to appease the Zamfara state government towards granting him amnesty (January 2022). PHOTO: SALIHU ALIYU

Amnesty and Peace Deals

The adoption of the incentive approach by some governors, which involves negotiated peace deals with bandits, is the most common response by Nigerian states in the North West to stem the wave of criminality. In December 2016, for example, the Government of Zamfara state struck peace deals with two major suspected leaders of bandits, Dogo Gide and Buharin Daji. On 1 August 2019, governors of the North West geopolitical zone, including Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Sokoto and Zamfara states, proclaimed amnesty for bandits operating in the zone.[14] In January 2021, the Zamfara state government granted amnesty to Auwalun Daudawa, the leader of the bandits that abducted over 300 schoolboys in Kankara.[15]

The peace deal or amnesty approach is, however, fraught with challenges, such as the absence of clear policy and legal frameworks to anchor the initiative, the lack of institutional platforms to facilitate sustainability, and the questions of inclusivity and transparency in the process. How state governments are able to correctly identify who is a bandit and what makes one a “repentant” criminal are equally significant concerns. Thus, sustained attacks and mass kidnapping by bandits have exposed the fragility and futility of this approach, further indicating the inability of the State to deal with organised criminal elements. As noted in the newspaper Punch:

[T]his dangerous policy of appeasement towards common felons emboldens them to continue to hold the society to ransom and encourages others to see criminality as a lucrative venture. Quite easily, most of the pardoned bandits tend to return to their evil ways even before the ink with which the peace deal was penned had dried up.[16]

In the absence of robust accountability mechanisms, the risk of politicisation and incentivisation of criminal violence through amnesty becomes high.

Military Operation

Although the Nigerian Government has designated bandits as terrorists and deployed the military in kinetic operations against these criminal elements, it has used its security forces sparingly to rescue abducted victims. Nigeria operates a national security architecture that is largely outdated and not fit-for-purpose. Therefore, the reliance on small security operations to rescue abducted victims is an unpopular response to the threat of mass abduction. However, in the case of the abduction of 80 Islamic school students in Dandume in December 2020, the students were quickly rescued by security forces after a fierce gun battle with the bandits.[17]

The military has created special operations forces (SOFs) to more effectively operate in enemy safe haven areas like creeks, jungles, forests and mountainous regions.[18] Despite having a team of SOFs and a police Intelligence Response Team (IRT), the Nigerian Government has not successfully deployed these elite forces to rescue victims of mass abduction. The reasons have to do with the complexity of logistics required, limited specialised equipment and skills in the elite units (SOFs and IRT), and the risk to abductees in the event of a failed rescue attempt. This may account for the preference for back-channel negotiations with abductors. This tactic has, however, not been completely effective, as evident in the inability of security operatives to secure the release of some victims after abduction operations. For example, some of the Kaduna Baptist School students abducted in July 2021 spent over 189 days in captivity before being released in batches following payment of ransom by their families. As of January 2022, only one student was still with the bandits.[19]

Girls who were kidnapped from a boarding school in the northwest Nigerian state of Zamfara, walk in line after their release (2 March 2021). PHOTO: REUTERS/AFOLABI SOTUNDE

Informal Negotiation

Reliance on back-channel or informal negotiation is the more common response by the Nigerian Government to the abduction saga. For example, the release of some of the Chibok schoolgirls was facilitated by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).[20] Similarly, the Kankara schoolboys were reportedly rescued with the help of the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN).[21] A popular Islamic cleric, Ahmad Gumi, initiated a negotiation with bandits after the Kagara school kidnapping, and later pushed for them to be granted amnesty. Although President Buhari recently declared that his “administration will not succumb to blackmail by bandits who target innocent school students in the expectations of huge ransom payments”,[22] many believe that ransoms are paid by either the families of victims or the authorities. The opacity of the entire process of negotiation means that several individuals benefit financially, materially, and even politically from the kidnapping enterprise. Yet the payment of ransoms, as rightly noted by Micheal Ross, produces obvious short-term benefits but much larger, hidden, long-term costs.[23] The obvious benefit is the release of the kidnapped victim; the hidden cost is the encouragement it gives to other groups that specialise in K4R. As with other types of crime, if kidnapping is sufficiently profitable, existing kidnapping organisations will expand and new kidnapping organisations will rise.[24]

Closure of Schools

The panicked closure of some schools in response to mass abduction is evident in some states in the region. In December 2020, both Katsina and Zamfara states closed several schools following the abduction of the Kankara schoolchildren. Similarly, in July 2021, Nigerian authorities in northwest Kaduna state closed 13 schools after more than 140 students were kidnapped from Baptist High School.[25] The increase in mass abduction of schoolchildren is crippling education in a region that is already educationally challenged. A 2018 survey by the United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef) indicates that over nine million children were out of school in Nigeria, with over 60% of them in northern Nigeria[26] (see Figure 3). The number of children not in school will increase, given the panicked closure of schools and possible absence by students due to fear of being kidnapped.

Figure 3: Number of Children not in School, by Geopolitical Zone in Nigeria[27]

Conclusion

Mass abductions of schoolchildren has spread from the northeast, through the northwest and to the north central zones in Nigeria. While the evolving threat has been globally condemned, there is growing local apprehension over the possible spread of this form of organised crime to other parts of Nigeria, given the notable weakness of the Nigerian State. Reversing the tide of mass abductions requires attention to the nature of the Nigerian political economy that fosters an environment permissive to the emergence and flourishing of criminal gangs. The Nigerian Government should urgently implement measures to drastically reduce poverty, create employment for the youth, curb widespread corruption, and confiscate illegal weapons in circulation. There is equally the need to strengthen protective systems around vulnerable schools, by conducting regular vulnerability threat assessments of schools and other potential targets (staff quarters), as well as adopting security early-warning systems (SEWS) with contingency and response plans. Finally, the government should discontinue payment of ransoms, and instead invest in intelligence gathering, and securing the nation’s porous borders.

Dr Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He is also Coordinator for the Security, Violence and Conflict (SVC) Research Group at the University.

Joseph Chukwunonso Akogwu is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science in Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka. He is also a doctoral student specialising in Human Security and Counter-Terrorism at the University of Nigeria.

Endnotes

[1] SBM Intelligence (2020) ‘The Economics of the Kidnap Industry in Nigeria, Lagos’, Available at: <https://www.sbmintel.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/202005_Nigeria-Kidnap.pdf> [Accessed 14 January 2022].

[2] Ukpe, William (2021) ‘Insecurity: N10 Billion Demanded in Kidnapping Ransoms in H1 2021- SBM’, Naira Metrics, 12 July, Available at: <https://nairametrics.com/2021/07/12/insecurity-n10-billion-demanded-in-kidnapping-ransoms-in-h1-2021-sbm> [Accessed 14 January 2022].

[3] Onuoha, Freedom and Okolie-Osemene, James (2019) ‘The Evolving Threat of Kidnapping for Ransom in Nigeria’, in Oshita, Alumona and Onuoha, Freedom (eds), Internal Security Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 233–258.

[4] Ojewale, Oluwole (2021) ‘Rising Insecurity in Northwest Nigeria: Terrorism Thinly Disguised as Banditry’, Brookings, 18 February, Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2021/02/18/rising-insecurity-in-northwest-nigeria-terrorism-thinly-disguised-as-banditry> [Accessed on 22 February 2022].

[5] Onuoha, Freedom (2021) ‘Threat of Kidnapping in Nigeria: Scale Dimensions, Trends and Drivers’, Paper presented at a Webinar on ‘Effective Response to Kidnapping in Nigeria’, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) Nigeria Alumni Chapter, 19 March.

[6] Ijaseun, David (2022) ‘From Dorm to Doom: A Timeline of the Chibok Kidnapping’, Business Day, 13 April. Available at: <https://businessday.ng/news/article/from-dorm-to-doom-a-timeline-of-the-chibok-kidnapping-till-date> [Accessed 15 June 2022].

[7] Onuoha, Freedom and Oyewole, Samuel (2018) ‘Anatomy of Boko Haram: The Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria’, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 28 April, Available at: <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/04/anatomy-boko-haram-rise-decline-violent-group-nigeria-180422110920231.html> [Accessed 5 January 2022].

[8] Authors’ mapping of the incidents of mass abduction in Nigeria reported in the media.

[9] Mosadomi, Wole (2021) ‘42 Persons Including 27 Students, 3 Staff Kidnapped at Govt College, Kagara.’ Vanguard, February 17. Available at: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/02/42-persons-including-27-students-3-staff-kidnapped-at-govt-college-kagara/> [Accessed 1 August 2021].

[10] Yusuf, Kabir (2021) ‘Timeline: Seven Years After Chibok, Mass Kidnapping of Students Becoming Norm in Nigeria’, Premium Times, 22 June, Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/469110-timeline-seven-years-after-chibok-mass-kidnapping-of-students-becoming-norm-in-nigeria.html> [Accessed 1 August 2021].

[11] France24 (2020) ‘Boko Haram Claims Kidnapping of Hundreds of Nigerian Schoolboys’, Available at: <https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20201215-boko-haram-claims-kidnapping-of-hundreds-of-nigerian-schoolboys> [Accessed 13 January 2022].

[12] Odunsi, Wale (2022) ‘Nigerian Military Arrests Security Agents Taking Ransom to Bandits in Kaduna’, Daily Post, 12 April, Available at: <https://dailypost.ng/2022/04/12/nigerian-military-arrests-security-agents-taking-ransom-to-bandits-in-kaduna; Owolabi, Femi (2021) ‘Seven Security Operatives Arrested for “Supplying” Arms, Military Kits to Bandits in Zamfara’, The Cable, 15 April, Available at: <https://www.thecable.ng/seven-security-operatives-arrested-for-supplying-arms-military-kits-to-bandits-in-zamfara> [Accessed 4 June 2022].

[13] BBC News (2021) ‘Nigeria’s Zamfara School Abduction: More than 300 Nigerian Girls Missing’, 26 February, Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-56188727> [Accessed 10 January 2022].

[14] Daily Times (2019) ‘North West Govs Grant Amnesty to Cattle Rustlers, Others’, 2 August, Available at: <https://dailytimes.ng/2019/08/02/north-west-govs-grant-amnesty-to-cattle-rustlers-others> [Accessed 10 January 2022].

[15] Alagbe, Jesusegun (2021) ‘After Amnesty, Zamfara Bandit Leader Returned to Crime, Killed’, Punch, 2 May, Available at: <https://punchng.com/after-amnesty-zamfara-bandit-leader-returned-to-crime-killed> [Accessed 4 February 2022].

[16] Punch Editorial Board (2019) ‘Zamfara: Government Deal with Bandits, Wrong’, 7 August, Available at: <https://punchng.com/zamfara-government-deal-with-bandits-wrong> [Accessed 3 February 2022].

[17] Sabiu, Muhammad (2020) ‘Katsina Again: 80 Islamic School Students Abducted, Rescued by Security Forces’, Nigerian Tribune, 20 December, Available at: <https://tribuneonlineng.com/katsina-again-80-islamic-school-students-abducted-rescued-by-security-forces> [Accessed 1 December 2021].

[18] Onuoha, Freedom and Ugwueze, Micheal (2020) ‘Special Operations Forces, Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency Operations in the Lake Chad Area: The Nigerian Experience’, in Usman, Tar and Bashir, Bala (eds), New Architecture of Regional Security in Africa: Perspectives on Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin,London: Lexington Books, pp. 267-293.

[19] Isenyo, Godwin (2022) ‘Two Kaduna Baptist School Students Released After 189 Days with Bandits’, Punch, 3 January, Available at: <https://punchng.com/two-kaduna-baptist-school-students-released-after-189-days-with-bandits> [Accessed 1 March 2022].

[20] Tukur, Sani and Agency Report (2017) ‘Red Cross Confirms Role in Chibok Girls Release’, Premium Times, 7 May, Available at: <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/230681-red-cross-explains-role-securing-release-82-chibok-girls.html> [Accessed 10 June 2021].

[21] Nwachukwu, John (2020) ‘Kankara: Miyetti Allah Negotiated Release of 333 Schoolboys not Boko Haram – Gov Matawalle’, Daily Post, 18 December, Available at: <https://dailypost.ng/2020/12/18/kankara-miyetti-allah-negotiated-release-of-333-schoolboys-not-boko-haram-gov-matawalle> [Accessed 1 December 2021].

[22] CGTN Africa (2021) ‘Buhari Says He “Will Not Succumb to Blackmail” After Mass Kidnapping’, 27 February, Available at: <https://africa.cgtn.com/2021/02/27/buhari-says-he-will-not-succumb-to-blackmail-after-mass-kidnapping> [Accessed 3 February 2022].

[23] Ross, Micheal (2003) ‘The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor’, in Banon, Ian and Collier, Paul (eds), Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions,Washington DC: The World Bank, pp. 17–42.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Obiezu, Timothy (2021) ‘Nigerian State Closes Schools after 140 Students Kidnapped’, VOA, 6 July, Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/africa_nigerian-state-closes-schools-after-140-students-kidnapped/6207902.html> [Accessed on 23 January 2022].

[26] Obiezu, Timothy (2018) ‘UN: In Nigeria More Than 13 Million School-age Children Out of School’, VOA, 11 December, Available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/nigeria-boko-haram/4695489.html> [Accessed 1 December 2021].

[27] Ojetunde, Damilola (2017) ‘Estimated Out-of-school Children Population’, Available at: <https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/C7Nj6/1> [Accessed 12 January 2021].

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The Role of Youths in Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-role-of-youths-in-countering-violent-extremism-in-northeast-nigeria%ef%bf%bc/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-role-of-youths-in-countering-violent-extremism-in-northeast-nigeria%25ef%25bf%25bc Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:02:41 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39664 The youth of Nigeria must be empowered to counter violent extremism and sustain peace and development.

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Introduction

Northeast Nigeria is the epicentre of violent extremism in the country. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, in particular, record high incidences of extremism regularly. Extremists have been responsible for various killings and wanton destruction in the north and other parts of Nigeria. At the centre of the violence are youths, who constitute the majority of the members of these extremist groups. Young people are easier targets for recruitment by extremist groups because of peer pressure, drug use, gang involvement, prior delinquency, family member gang-involvement, membership in a cult, and the quest for adventure, among others.

In spite of their involvement in violent extremism, it is recognised globally that the youth can be equal partners in its prevention. The youth should be considered a country’s asset, as the future of the country as well as having the potential to be leaders of today. However, a growing ‘youth bulge’ of unemployable young people trying to survive – and subject to recruitment by armed extremist groups – is problematic, and can even present a threat to prosperity and peace.[1]

Boko Haram, which started as a peaceful proselyting group of moderate Muslim clerics, has evolved into a radical group with extremist views. PHOTO: REUTERS/ZANAH MUSTAPHA

The Rise of Violent Extremist Groups in Northeast Nigeria

Violent extremist views in Nigeria can be traced back to organisations such as the Wahhabi-inspired Izala, the Islamic Movement, and the Maitasine Movement, which began as ethnically homogenous groups with purely domestic concerns.[2] Groups like the Izala, a Muslim fundamentalist group founded by Sheikh Mahmud Abubakar Gumi, the Islamic Movement of Ibrahim El-Zakzaky, which led to the Maitasine Movement and other ideologically inspired domestic violent extremists, have been active in the northern part of country for decades. The Maitasine conflicts in the north in the 1980s, for example, were the result of violent extremist views perpetrated by the group. All these groups were the forerunners of the Boko Haram, a Salafist sect affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Boko Haram was founded in Maiduguri in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, a native of Gashua in Yobe state. Boko Haram is at the root of violent extremism in Nigeria in recent times.

Boko Haram, which started as a peaceful proselyting group of moderate Muslim clerics, has in recent years evolved into a radical group with extremist views. For example, the group forbids western education, which it claims is corrupting, although some of its members are beneficiaries of western education.

Boko Haram is based in Northeast Nigeria, specifically Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states,  with operational bases in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. They seek to establish a caliphate, or Islamic state, in Nigeria.[3] The group has attacked  police headquarters, the United Nations (UN) office in Abuja, and churches, among others.

Youths in Nigeria protest the long record of abuse, by the police, of Nigerian citizens. These individuals described the State military as brutal, merciless, and pitiless. PHOTO: STEVE EASON

Youths as Victims and Perpetrators of Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria

Youths in Nigeria have achieved notoriety in recent years for their involvement in criminal acts, such as robbery, kidnapping, Internet fraud, rape, drug abuse, banditry, and violent extremism. Prior to this, they were widely seen as a driving force in the  political arena of the country. They spearheaded Nigeria’s quest for independence from colonial rule. In the immediate post-independence era, youths were also involved in various forms of activism, which further shaped government decision-making. However, this golden age of characterised by youth activism in Nigeria has been replaced by a recourse to terrorism and violent extremist acts, among other crimes.

Extremist groups often recruit youths who are dissatisfied and willing to do anything under the illusion that it will improve their circumstances. Potential terrorist recruits typically fall into the age group of 15 to 25 years old. Between 2014 and 2016, Boko Haram reportedly abducted 10 000 boys and trained them as foot soldiers.[4] Since then, there has also been a steady flow of young people of both genders, into the group, either voluntarily or under duress.

Some youths are conscripted through coercion from family members who are already members of an extremist group. Female captives suffer the most, as they are held in captivity as sex slaves, molested and, in some instances, married off without their or their parents’ consent. Those who are fortunate enough to escape or be rescued return pregnant or with children born to sect members, and have to bear the stigma that goes with this. As victims as well as perpetrators of violent extremism, these young people are also trained as suicide bombers and deployed to commit acts of murder-suicide.

The Internet will continue to play a crucial role in the recruitment, indoctrination and training of youths in future extremist groups. PHOTO: ALEXANDER JOE/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

Anger over extra-judicial killings and injustice and the need for revenge are further reasons why youths join extremist groups. In a study conducted between December 2015 and January 2016 based on interviews with 119 former Boko Haram members, 57% of the respondents identified revenge as a major or the sole reason for joining the sect. These individuals described the State military as brutal, merciless, and pitiless.[5] Revenge, which is often directed at the State, and particularly the security forces, has a strong influence in the sect’s recourse to violence and members’ willingness to join the group because of the brutality they or family members suffered at the hands of security forces. Contrary to popular opinion, religion was cited by only 9.24% of the respondents and has relatively little or no influence on the decision to join the group, while unemployment (5.88%) also played a lesser role in the decision to become a member of an extremist group.It was found that a little over half (51%) of the respondents were employed before joining the organisation. However, poverty (15.13%) played a somewhat greater role compared to these factors.[6]

Social media also plays a large role in the radicalisation of young people who are the majority of users globally.[7] Nigeria is one of the countries with the highest number of Internet users in Africa, at 123.49 million people.[8] In recent years, extremists have used the Internet to recruit radicalised individuals and it is believed that the Internet will continue to play a crucial role in the recruitment, indoctrination, and training of future terrorists. Among extremist groups in sub-Saharan Africa, the Islamic State in the West African Province (ISWAP) is believed to be the most sophisticated and effective in terms of using technology and the media in its operations.[9]

Participants at the launch of the Amman Declaration on Youth, Peace and Security held in Mogadishu, Somalia (December 2015). UN PHOTO / ILYAS AHMED

Frameworks for the Participation of Youths in Countering Violent Extremism

The importance of youths as equal partners in development has been recognised worldwide. In 1965, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples, stressing the importance of the role of the youth and their potential to contribute to security and development. Another UNGA declaration in 1979 proclaimed 1985 as ‘International Youth Year, Participation, Development, and Peace’ to increase awareness of the situation, needs, and aspirations of youths, with a view to engaging them in the development process.[10] The adoption of the World Programme of Action for Youth by the UNGA from 2000 further highlighted the importance of and universal concern over the issues faced by youths.

There has also been a series of declarations focusing on youth and development, such as the Amman Youth Declaration of August 2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security of December 2015, and the UNSC Resolution 2282 on the Review of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture –  all underscoring the important role youths play in preventing conflict and maintaining peace and security despite violent extremism.[11] The 2015 UN Plan of Action Against Violent Extremism recognises the positive role young people can play in countering violent extremism (CVE).[12] At the regional level, organisations like the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have long-standing youth charters and policies. However, while some national governments have similar frameworks, they do not yet fully mainstream youth participation in peace processes.

A young woman speaks at a Political Leadership Among Youth event in Abuja, Nigeria, and advocates for ways to increase the participation of youth and women in the political process (February 2015). PHOTO: USAID SUPPORTING POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA PROJECT

The Role of Youths in Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria

The involvement of young people as perpetrators of violence has led various stakeholders in society to stereotype them as the problem. This overlooks the fact that the solution to violent extremism and other threats to safety and stability can be found in working with young people and tapping into their talents and potential to reform and rebuild society.[13] Despite efforts made globally to address violent extremism through youth engagement, the youth in Nigeria remains marginalised in this arena. Nigeria’s approach to insecurity issues has always been the deployment of police and military operations to troubled areas. Initiatives such as Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST) do not include the youth, as CVE efforts have long been considered the exclusive preserve of older adult men. This is based on the assumption that extremism, like war, is primarily a problem for men to address. As a result, any youth efforts at tackling violent extremism in the Northeast are mainly spearheaded by individuals, civil society organisations (CSOs), and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). However, Nigerian youths can participate in CVE efforts through the various strategies discussed below.

Youth associations can play critical roles in CVE. Nigerian youths can form or belong to associations and NGOs and through these platforms, counter violent extremism by mobilising other young people who refuse to join violent extremist organisations. Youths can oppose extremist groups seeking to recruit members of CSOs because of the dynamism they bring to their activities. Globally, to extend their influence, acquire moral credibility, and gain supporters, extremist groups often create and support voluntary associations and give them money. By joining or forming associations and NGOs, young people can benefit from mutual support, strengthen their efforts to prevent radicalisation, resist the spread of false information and intolerance, and help those who have been radicalised to reintegrate successfully and peacefully into society. An example of this is The Tolerance Academy, a flagship project of the Youth Tolerance for Peace Development Initiative (YTFPDI) founded by Jonah Ayodele Obajeun, a Nigerian youth activist.[14]

Adopting targeted interventions is also a strategy that young people can employ in their efforts to counter violent extremism. For example, youths can intervene to help people who are on a path towards radicalisation, but are not yet involved in violent attacks. Such interventions can prevent individuals from joining dangerous groups and doing harm to themselves and others. As part of targeted interventions, youths can inspire their peers to make a positive difference, work together to help those struggling to resist extremism, promote peace and security locally and regionally, and make their voices heard in mainstream and social media.

Social media remains a major tool in the hands of the youth in their fight against violent extremist groups. PHOTO: SOKI BRIGGS

The organisation of conferences, symposia, and seminars which focus on the role of youths in national security, peacebuilding, and preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is another strategy that can help the youth in curbing violent extremism. They can partner with other youth organisations within or outside the country to organise such events. Proper training may be required for effective organisation of such events and in this regard, they should partner with NGOs, CSOs, and advocacy groups who offer such training.

Apart from youths who have not joined extremist groups, former youth extremists can also be agents of positive social change by assisting households and communities to respond resiliently to violence. They can play a vital and irreplaceable role in efforts to bring societies together, generate prosperity and employment, and resolve personal, community and larger-scale conflicts and grievances, many of which drive radicalisation.[15] For example, young people can be important shapers of religious narratives that oppose violence by being part of efforts to promote peacebuilding and religious tolerance.

Despite its misuse, social media remains a major tool in the hands of the youth in their fight against violent extremist groups. Young CVE activists in Nigeria can use technology innovatively to prevent radicalisation and recruitment by forming and maintaining an online platform or presence for this purpose. An example from the UK is #NotAnotherBrother, launched by the Quilliam Foundation in 2015, which was an online and offline communications solution and a crowd-funded counter-narrative campaign to prevent youths from joining the Islamic State (IS).[16] It is important that young people who work to counter violent extremism are innovative, imaginative, and make full use of their ability to employ social media creatively, as the challenge is not just to oppose violent extremism but to develop better alternatives for people who are drawn to radical propaganda.

Young people can also be part of localised efforts to tackle violent extremism. As a core part of families and communities, young people have vital contributions to make to a more expansive understanding of the local context for CVE, including violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, and its underlying causes. They can help formulate and deliver tailored CVE responses that are more localised, inclusive, credible, resonant, and therefore sustainable and effective. This is helpful, as youth-mainstreamed CVE needs to address localised youth-based recruiting, organisational youth dynamics, local youth dynamics, and other localised needs appropriately to be most effective.

Youth Vigilante Initiatives groups operate check points, where they apprehend suspected Boko Haram members and hand them over to the military. PHOTO: IMMANUEL ABAYOMI AFOLABI

Conclusion

The youth are a fulcrum in every society and just as they are the future of a nation, so can they play a detrimental role and prevent the progress of a nation if they are not positively and actively engaged. Youth empowerment remains a veritable means to fast-track development, and engender and sustain peace in Northeast Nigeria and the country at large. To this end, youths must be empowered economically and educationally. Education, for instance, is critical to any role young people might play in violent extremism. Making young people more aware of its evils through education and critical thinking is the first line of defence against violent extremism. Additionally, the government at all levels should support youth initiatives financially and ensure that corruption practices which hamper the successful and efficient delivery of support packages to youth groups and organisations in the Northeast are addressed. Young people should also be mainstreamed in decision-making at all levels. States should partner with relevant actors to ensure that they can participate in peacebuilding activities. This will give the youth a sense of belonging and purpose.

It is imperative for the Nigerian Government, local authorities in the Northeast, international agencies, the private sector, CSOs, faith-based organisations and religious leaders to expand the role of youths in CVE efforts by recognising and supporting what young people are already doing to prevent violence and violent extremism and build upon existing capacities, networks, and resources for young people in these areas. Some of the efforts aimed at addressing violent extremism in the Northeast include the Youth Vigilante Initiatives in Madagali, Gombi, Mubi South, the North Local Government of Adamawa state, and the Biu Local Government of Bornu state. These initiatives, spearheaded by vigilante groups, operate check points and move from house to house to apprehend suspected Boko Haram members and hand them over to the military. The initiatives have been successful in the area of expelling the Boko Haram sect from communities where they operate and community members now have more faith in these youth initiatives than the Nigerian Government or the military. With the help of the Kinjir Foundation and the Centre for Sustainable Development and Education in Africa, the Madagali Youth Vigilante Initiative is presently being transformed into a sustainable grassroots peacebuilding organisation equipped with conflict-resolution skills to impact their communities positively.

The youth must be seen as presenting an opportunity rather than a threat. As such, young people should be perceived as important citizens, potential ambassadors for peace, and leaders in countering violent extremism.

Dr Angela Ajodo-Adebanjoko is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Federal University of Lafia, Nasarawa state, Nigeria.

Endnotes

[1] Mlambo, Nontobeko (2020) ‘Africa: Triple Threat – Conflict, Gender-Based Violence and COVID-19,’ All Africa, 26 April, Available at: <https://allafrica.com/stories/202004240366.html> [Accessed 5 June 2020].

[2] Buchanan-Clarke, Stephen and Lekalake, Rorisang (2016) ‘Let the People Have a Say’, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 32, June.

[3] Botha, Anneli and Abdile, Mahdi (n.d.) ‘Getting Behind the Profiles of Boko Haram Members and Factors Contributing to Radicalisation Versus Working Towards Peace’, KAICIID International Dialogue Centre, Available at: <https://www.kaiciid.org/publications-resources/getting-behind-profiles-boko-haram-members-summary> [Accessed 29 January 2020].

[4] Hinshaw, Drew and Parkinson, Joe (2016) ‘The 10,000 Kidnapped Boys of Boko Haram’, Wall Street Journal, 12 August, Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-kidnapped-boys-of-boko-haram-1471013062> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

[5] Botha, Anneli and Abdile, Mahdi (n.d.) op. cit.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Johnson, Joseph (2020) ‘Africa: Number of Internet Users in Selected Countries 2019’, Available at: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/505883/number-of-internet-users-in-african-countries> [Accessed 26 November 2020].

[8] Cadmus, Femi (2021) ‘Technology, Legal Information, and Access to Justice in Africa’, In Ndulo, Muna and Emeziem, Cosmas (eds), The Routledge Handbook of African Law,Abingdon, UK: Routledge.

[9] Ajodo-Adebanjoko, Angela (2020) ‘The Rise and Influence of ISIS in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in Kieh, George and Kalu, Kelechi (eds), Civil Conflicts and Peacebuilding in Africa, Washington DC: Lexington Books.

[10] Dokubo, Charles (2018) ‘Youth Empowerment and National Development in Nigeria: Niger Delta Amnesty Program in Perspective’, Paper presented at a National Defense College seminar on Enhancing National Development through Youth Empowerment, 3 October, Abuja.

[11] UN (2015) ‘Amman Youth Declaration Adopted at Global Forum on Youth, Peace and Security’, Available at: <https://www.un.org/youthenvoy/2015/08/amman-youth-declaration-adopted-global-forum-youth-peace-security> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

[12] Obi, Cyril (2017) ‘Preventing Youth Engagement in Organized Violence’, Draft Report of UN Expert Group on Youth, Peace and Security: Social Issues and Social Policies, pp. 4–7, Available at: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2017/12/17-EGM-Advance-Report-on-Youth-Peace-and-Security.pdf> [Accessed 18 March 2020].

[13] Ekpon, Theophilus (2017) ‘The Role of Young People in Preventing Violent Extremism in the Lake Chad Basin: A Contribution to the Progress Study on Youth, Peace and Security Mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015)’, Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Available at: <https://www.youth4peace.info/system/files/2018-04/12.%20TP_The%20Role%20of%20Young%20People%20in%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20the%20Lake%20Chad%20Basin_CSPPS.pdf> [Accessed 22 August 2020].

[14] Kofi Anan Foundation (2014) ‘Extremely Together, Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Young People by Young People’, Available at: <https://www.extremelytogether-theguide.org/pdf/ExtremelyTogether_CounteringViolentExtremism_Guide_2017_March.pdf> [Accessed 26 November 2020].

[15] Ibid.

[16] European Commission (2016) ‘#NotAnotherBrother’, Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/networks/radicalisation-awareness-network-ran/collection-inspiring-practices/ran-practices/notanotherbrother_en> [Accessed June 2022].

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The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security and the Energy Revolution https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/the-risk-pivot-great-powers-international-security-and-the-energy-revolution/#utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-risk-pivot-great-powers-international-security-and-the-energy-revolution Fri, 19 Aug 2022 04:00:47 +0000 https://www.accord.org.za/?post_type=conflict-trends&p=39658  The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security and the Energy Revolution shows a good understanding of conflict trends in Africa. The book highlights and provides evidence for the dangers existing in the energy revolution from fossil fuels to much-needed environmentally friendly, sustainable, and renewable energy that has become the next frontier in great power rivalries. […]

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 The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security and the Energy Revolution shows a good understanding of conflict trends in Africa. The book highlights and provides evidence for the dangers existing in the energy revolution from fossil fuels to much-needed environmentally friendly, sustainable, and renewable energy that has become the next frontier in great power rivalries. Both the United States (US) and China are valuable stakeholders in this area and command geopolitical influence on the African continent. The book brings into perspective the geopolitical consequences of the revolutionary energy supply, demand and flow and how it is transforming the global economy, international security, and the order of states. According to the authors, the emergence of global middle-class countries, such as the Asian giants, a fast-growing source of energy demand, combined with security-challenged energy producers and exporters, such as Algeria, Libya and Nigeria in Africa, represents geopolitical instability. 

The authors lay out the foreign policy and security implications of dramatic changes in energy production, distribution and consumption. The danger, what the authors refer to as risk pivot, in international security is caused by a number of factors. The first factor is the increasing dependence of rising Asian powers, such as India and China, on Middle East oil and gas supplies. The second factor is the new energy partnership between China and Russia, a leading fossil fuel producer. The third factor is the shifting centre of global energy markets as a result of energy revolutions in the US. The fourth factor is the increased energy demands due to the rising global middle class, which poses challenges for governance and development. The final factor is the role of the US in securing energy flows from the Middle East following its Asia re-alignment. 

Notably, the shifts in the global energy sector, with increased demand from the rising powers, have the potential to fuel conflicts. On the other hand, the energy revolution in technology and markets in the US is enhancing and strengthening the US position in international affairs. The Risk Pivot also represents the strategic dilemmas faced by the great powers to balance their needs for fossil fuels with mounting efforts to tackle climate change, as well as the strategic choice of whether to use energy as a weapon of geopolitics or a tool of a stable order.

The introduction examines the post-World War II development of the global energy order and introduces the relationship between energy revolution and geopolitics. The interplay between the US’s strategic choices and Asia’s vulnerabilities is at the heart of Chapter Two of the book. Jones and Steven provide scenarios on the role of the US following its increased energy leverage: whether to take the greatest opportunity to lead or to isolate from global risks. It also examines the geopolitics with China. Chapter Three analyses ways in which the great power-driven energy revolution is affecting the rest of the world from middle powers to the new global middle class in Africa, Latin America, and the Gulf. The main argument is that energy and climate dynamics are posing new challenges for the US-led international order, exposing massive gaps in prosperity between the West and its rising competitors, such as the BRICS nations. It is noted that the world’s energy and other resources come from fragile frontiers, which includes Africa, and represents a risk, since the geopolitics of energy and the geopolitics of development are intertwined.

The final chapter responds to questions and thoughts that emanate from Chapter Four. It establishes the critical link between the geopolitics of energy security and the geopolitics of climate change, along with the issue of energy development and access in the Global South. The global governance architecture in relation to energy and climate change is considered under sustainable globalisation, where policy-makers are faced with a choice to reform and extend the existing Western institutions or create new institutions. The severity of climate change and its potential to increase the risks faced by stable states are underscored. Chapter five explores the relationship between energy and power, introducing the question of governance. It expands on the opportunity the US has to carve a climate solution from a strengthened geopolitical consensus. The authors suggest that the US should build a new pillar of international governance to ensure stability in energy and climate. 

Although the authors pose many critical questions, they ultimately cannot provide satisfactory answers for all of them, especially on how the US will wield its enduring energy influence to support vulnerable countries, such as those in Africa that have emerged as the sources of global energy resources that are scrambled upon by the rising powers. Second, the issue of the emerging global middle class is not fully addressed from the perspective of US leadership. What should be done to meet the energy needs of middle powers while eliminating the risks at the same time remains unclear. Third, the assertion that “domestic politics and foreign policies of China are shaped by energy insecurity” (p. 1) is contestable because China continues to take prominence in the energy sector despite being one of the largest consumers. China leads the world in renewable energy installations and the use of technology for carbon capture and storage programmes, even though this has recently slowed down due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The Risk Pivot argues that the central geopolitical question of our time is how the established Western international order will integrate China, India, and the other rising giants of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This argument creates an assumption that China and the emerging giants are not integrated in the current international order. It implies they are somewhere outside the established order, which is not the case. The international order created by the West after World War II established geopolitical innovations and institutions that have already accommodated and integrated China and the rising giants. China, for instance, is a member of the United Nations (UN), the UN Security Council, and other Western engineered institutions, protocols, and frameworks. African nations, China, India, and the other giants can only adjust their positions within the Western international order, but the question is how much can they adjust their positions in the energy sphere.

The geopolitical consequences of the energy revolution are not limited to risks only, as largely discussed in the book. The energy revolution also has potential benefits, such as the general reduction in conflict and greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) and the opportunity for possible cooperation among different countries to stabilise and diversify the power towards the green grids. The resulting energy efficiency can lead to economic growth, political stability, and general sustainable development. The energy revolution is likely to lead to greater exposure to new opportunities for innovation, growth and development. 

Irrespective of the shortcomings discussed, the timely research in The Risk Pivot: Great Powers, International Security and the Energy Revolution is overarching. It is an important read for academics, policy-makers and professionals in diplomacy, foreign policy, international relations, geopolitics, energy, and international security.

Felix Shihundu is a graduate student in the Department of International Relations at Ankara Social Sciences University, Turkey.

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